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INTRODUCTION
Regulation of natural gas prices at the production level has
traditionally posed a vexing problem for regulatory authorities.

Frequently condemned as irreconcilable with the realities of the
industry, conventional modes of regulatory pricing burdened the rate-

making process beyond the limits of feasible administrative control.
In 1965 the Federal Power Commission responded to this situation by

adopting a new regulatory scheme whereby prices were established on
an area-rather than an individual producer-basis.1 Subsequently
approved by the Supreme Court,2 the area approach could potentially
alleviate the difficulties which plagued former pricing systems. Before

considering the theoretical justification, utility, and potential scope of
the area approach, it will be instructive to examine briefly the
structure of the natural gas industry and the prior attempts at its

regulation.
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW OF THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY

During the period of rapidly expanding demand for fuel since
World War II, natural gas has become an increasingly important

component of the nation's fuel supply. In 1945, for example, natural
gas provided 13.7 percent of the total energy supply in the United
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. 1960, Oberlin
College; LL.B. 1963, Columbia University.
** Member, Illinois Bar. A.B. 1966, Princeton University; J.D. 1969, Northwestern
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1. Area Rate Proceeding 61-1 (Permian Basin), 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965). Since this initial

pronouncement the Commission has decided Area Rate Proceeding AR61-2 (Southern
Louisiana), FPC Op. No. 546 (Sept. 25, 1968), affdsub norn. Austral Oil Co. v. F.P.C.,.
F.2d (5th Cir. 1970); Pipeline Production Area Rate Proceeding RP66-24 (Phase I), FPC
Op. No. 568 (Oct. 7, 1969). Decisions by Hearing Examiners have been issued in Area Rate
Proceeding AR64-1 (Hugoton-Anadarko), "Sept. 16, 1968; Area Rate Proceeding AR64-2
(Texas Gulf Coast Area), Sept. 16, 1968; and Area Rate Proceeding AR67-1 (Other Southwest),
Sept. 22, 1969.
2. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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States while coal accounted for 46.8 percent In 1967, gas supplied 36
percent of the energy industry's total output compared to 26 percent
for coal. Although approximately 66 percent of the natural gas sold
in 1967 was consumed by industrial or commercial customers,'
natural gas lends itself to a variety of residential uses as well., In the
residential and commercial markets, natural gas competes with
electricity, coal, and oil. The primary competitors of natural gas in
the industrial market are coal, oil, and atomic energy. Interfuel
competition is affected considerably by the great costs usually
incurred in switching to an alternative fuel source once the consumer
has adapted to gas!
The industry consists of three basic functional levels: production
and gathering in the field; transportation, primarily through pipelines,
to the area in which the gas will be marketed; and distribution to the
ultimate consumer. The production of natural gas involves
exploration, discovery, and extraction. Related to production is the
gathering and processing function which occurs after the gas is
brought to the surface. Being of variable quality, the gas is sorted
according to its quality level and subjected to increased pressure,
and, if necessary, refined before being transported to the carrier pipeline The pipelines then transport the gas from the production fields to
local distributors throughout the nation. Retail distribution to
industrial, commercial, and residential consumers, the final phase in
the process, is generally accomplished by a firm having a monopoly
over this function within its locale.
3. 2 U.S.

BUREAU OF MINES, MINERALS YEARBOOK-1960 at4

(1961) [hercinaftere cited as

YEARBOOK].

4. 2 YEARBOOK-1967 at4.

5. Id. at 755-56, 768-69; CHASE

MANHATTAN BANK, OUTLOOK FOR ENERGY IN TilE UNITED

STATES 44 (1968). The industrial statistic includes gas used to generate electricity which, of
course, competes with gas in the consumer market.
6. See generally A. LEESTON, J. CRICHTON & J. JACOBS, THE DYNAMIC NATURAL GAS

INDUSTRY 184-225 (1963) [hereinafter cited as LEESTON, CRICHTON & JACOBS].
7. The potential customer can exercise a great deal of choice in selecting a particular fuel, but
once that choice is made he is practically locked in. See P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC
UTILITY ECONOMICS 324 (1964) [hereinafter cited as GARFIELD & LOVElOY]. The industrial
customer is much less affected by the conversion costs than is the residential or commercial user,
since the industrial user can now purchase multi-fuel boilers which allow switching from one fuel
to another. LEESTON, CRICHTON & JACOBS 213-16.
8. The major deposits of natural gas in this country are located in the states of Texas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Kansas. The reserves of quality gas in the Appalachian
area have been so depleted that the region is less important today. See FPC, SALES BY
PRODUCERS OF NATURAL GAS TO INTERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES-1966 VIII-XIII (1967).
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Some integration of these threefunctional levels within the natural

gas industry has been evidenced. Integration has been typically
accomplished by the establishment of holding companies operating

each distinct phase through separate subsidiariesY Frequently a joint
venture was developed to control a particular operation. 0
Nevertheless, many non-integrated, independent firms exist at all

three levels."
Rate regulation has been utilized primarily in situations where

oligopoly or monopoly conditions exist or where the regulated
industry competes with another regulated industry in need of
protection from competition from the former. 2 The protection

provided by rate regulation is designed to supplement or substitute for
the pressures against unreasonable prices afforded by competition and

the antitrust laws. Regulation of the natural gas industry to assure
adequate exploration and production to meet public needs and to

control the cost to the ultimate consumer has long been considered

necessary. 13 The essential problems that have arisen concern the

nature of regulation, the locus of administrative control, and
determination of the facets of the industry requiring regulation.

Certain aspects of the industry, particularly the retail distribution
level, clearly fall within the definition of a classic monopoly. 4 It is
9. See, e.g..

GARFIELD

& Lovjoy 434-46; Huitt, National Regulation of the Natural Gas

Industry. in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY FORMULATION 57 (E. Redford ed. 1956)
[hereinafter cited as Huitt]. See generally LEESTON, CRICHTON & JACOBS 128-70.
10. In addition to the material cited in note 9 supra,see GARFIELD & LOvEjOY 320. For a
recent example of an attempt to create joint ventures between two pipelines to construct a third,
see Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953,961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Pacific
Northwest Pipeline Corp., 22 F.P.C. 1091, 1094, 1110-11 (1959) (joint agreements to share
gathering facilities and coordinate other operating activities).
11. GARFIELD & LOVEjOY 320; W. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATED
INDUSTRIES 17 (1967). See generally LEESTON, CRICHTON & JACOBS 128-70.

12. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 3-25 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as BONBRIGHT]; GARFIELD & LovEJoy 15-27, 78-83. Non-monopolistic
situations where price control has been imposed to protect against market irregularities include
most of the transportation industry, most agricultural price-regulated products, grain elevators,
and wartime price and rent controls. Many leading cases establishing various aspects of
government power to regulate prices have involved non-monopolistic situations. See, e.g.,
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (regulation of raisin prices); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934) (control of milk prices); Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391
(1894) (grain elevator rates where competition existed).
13. See generally GARFIELD & LovEaoy 1-15, 27-35, 301; W. JONES, supra note 11, at 64-68;
LEESTON, CRICHTON & JACOBS

260-81; Huitt 55-63.

14. For concise definitions of the classic public utility monopoly, see
GARFIELD & LovEjoY

15-16.

BONBRIGHT

10-13;
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economically wasteful in most instances to provide two or more gas
mains to serve a single customer or area. At the transportation level,
the same conclusion usually applies. Construction of pipelines, the
most efficient method of bulk delivery, requires large capital
expenditures, particularly since the fields are generally located at
great distances from the prime Eastern and Northern industrial
markets. Occasionally when the market demand is large enough to
support more than one pipeline, some competition is feasible. Even
then, however, the required high investment may necessitate
regulation to assure the most efficient use of the facility. At best the
competition is of an oligopolistic nature, indicating the need for
5
public control.1
Economically dissimilar from the transportation and distribution
phases of the industry, the production and gathering function appears
to be, with qualification, economically consistent with the existence of
a competitive market. It is characterized by the presence of many
firms, ease of entry, and a high degree of speculative investment
interest. 6 However, certain unique characteristics of the industry
qualify the parallels between the production of natural gas and a
competitive industry. First, since.a considerable amount of gas is
produced in conjunction with oil drilling, supply of that "associated
gas" is affected by factors having no relation to the demand for
natural gas. 7 Second, risks inherent in the discovery procedure,
including elements of luck not usually present in the normal
competitive market place, make prediction of costs hazardous until
the recovery is completed. Ordinarily a firm can predict with
reasonable accuracy the number of products of a certain quality
which will result from investment of a given sum. An extractive
industry, particularly the natural gas industry, does not enjoy such
predictability. Whether any gas will be discovered from a given
15. See FTC REPORT ON UTILITY CORPORATIONS,'S. Doc. No. 92,70th Cong., ist Scss., pt.
84-1,615-16 (1935).
16. See generally P. MACAVOY, PRICE FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS 1-92 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as MAcAvoY]; E. NEUNER, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 1-112 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as NEUNER].
17. See, e.g., GARFIELD & LovFjoy 319; Kahn, EconomicIssues in Regulating the FieldPrice
of Natural Gas, 50 AM. EcON. REV. 506, 507 (May 1960). The importance of the

interrelationship between oil and gas may be lessened by the recent development of directional
drilling which allows discovery and production of only non-associated gas. See Area Rate
Proceeding 61-I (Permian Basin), 34 F.P.C. 306, 325-33 (1964) (Hearing Examiner's initial
decision in the Permian case).
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expenditure and the quantity and quality of the gas produced if a
discovery is made are matters of speculation.!8 Finally, conservation
measures under state law significantly affect natural gas production
with the greatest effect on the production of associated gas. 9 Thus, all
of these factors at the production and gathering level provide special

problems for regtalation that are not clearly soluble by reference to.
either a competitive market or classic monopoly regulatory policy.

Any solution must be based upon an analysis of the nature and degree
of competition in the industry at the production level. The possession
of any monopolistic or oligopolistic power by natural gas producers

may be discovered in one of two ways: structural analysis involving
the number and relative size of the firms in the market or a conduct

analysis which examines the pricing pattern and other conduct of the
producers to determine whether these factors comport reasonably

with probable conduct in a competitive market. Since abnormal
conduct can occur as a result of short-range factors which will be
corrected by the market over time, conduct analysis frequently fails to

yield any firm conclusion. Also, monopolistic and competitive
conduct often appear the sameP

The usual structural indicia of monopoly are the existence of one
or a very few firms in the market and high entry barriers which

protect the monopolist from potential competition within a
significant price range. Neither of these factors relating primarily to
18. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 542-45 (1960); GARFIELD & LOVEJOY
321-22, 334. The "luck" element does not loom as important in financial terms for the large
firms because the large number of drillings permits the firm to predict the risk factor more
accurately and to insure against that risk as a normal expense. Predictability has been improved
for all firms through recent advances in exploration technology. GARFIELD & LovEJoy 318-21.
See also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 34 F.P.C. 159, 185-86 (1965) (opinion of the
Commission); 34 F.P.C. 306, 323-29 (1964) (Hearing Examiner's opinion). However, large
companies may have received the most benefit. 34 F.P.C. at 186.See GARFIELD & LoVEJoY 32031.
19. See, e.g., H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL& GAS LAW, MANUAL OFTERMs 321-23 (1964);
Williams, Conservation of OilandGas,65 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1952); Comment, Prorationin
Texas: Conservation or Confiscation, 11 Sw. L.J. 186 (1957). Related to prorating is the
developing law of pooling and unitization. For a through discussion of voluntary and
compulsory pooling and unitization measures, see 6 WILLIAM & MEYERS, supra §§ 901-02,905,
910,912-13.
20. For example, while relative uniformity in pricing conduct among the firms in the market
is one of the indicia of monopolistic power, fully competitive market prices also tend to be
uniform. The monopolistic firm's price does not necessarily relate to cost, while the competitive
market price will.
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natural or technological economies of scale2' seems to exist to any
significant
degree in the natural gas production industry.
Although
no reliable statistics on the exact number of independent
producers in the country are readily available, the figure certainly

runs into the thousands. 2 In addition, a large number of potential
competitors operate on the periphery of the production industry.

Sales concentration figures also indicate that concentration in
natural gas production cannot readily be characterized as
monopolistic or oligopolistic. The Federal Power Commission's

statistics on sales by independent producers to interstate pipelines
show the following concentration in sales by volume and revenue: 3

First Company
First 4 Companies
First 8 Companies
First 20 Companies
First 50 Companies
First 100 Companies
All 3,509 Companies

Percent of Total
Production
6.9
23.9
38.6
60.2
78.4
83.6
100.0

Percent of Total
Revenues
7.4
24.0
38.5
60.6
79.8
86.9
100.0

21. See GARFIELD & LovEloy 16-19; BONBRIGHT 11-13.
22. Annual FPC statistics which include only producers who sell in interstate commerce and
whose name first appears on the contract indicate that the number has averaged approximately
3,500. Since considerable gas is sold by consortiums of many producers, the number of
producers is obviously much larger. Moreover, this figure does not include producers that sell
only in the intrastate market. Whatever the exact number, there are enough producers that the
existence of monopoly or even oligopoly power is doubtful. See the annual editions of FPC,
STATISTICS OF NATURAL GAS COMPANIES from

1963 through 1967.

23. Compiled from id. (1967). Again two caveats are required. First, these statistics report
only interstate sales, excluding a large market in intrastate gas. Since gas destined to the
intrastate market could be diverted to the interstate market, the entire sales concentration would
be a more accurate statistic. Second, sales are attributed to only one firm although several firms
may be producing the gas and selling it jointly. Thus it could be argued that the FPC statistics
grossly overstate the concentration. Neveriheless, since it is unlikely that there is competition
between the firms engaged in any of these joint selling operations which permeate the industry, it
does not seem unfair to lump the firms into dominant groups.
The concentration shown by these statistics is somewhat higher than that shown by a much
more elaborate study based upon 1953 sales statistics. Although the age of that study affects its
relevance, it showed concentration ratios on volume as follows:
4 largest producers 17%
8 largest producers 28%
20 largest producers 46%
50 largest producers 66%
100 largest producers 78%
NEUNER 22.
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At most these statistics indicate a moderate degree of concentration
that may be characterized as a loose oligopoly' The concentration
should not be sufficient, on a national scale at least, to give the firms
pricing power. If concentration ratios are much higher in local producing areas, and there is little or no competition between areas, a
different conclusion might follow. The only data available are dated
and inconclusive and indicate that although concentration in a local
area may exceed the national level, this concentration is not alarming
and may be mitigated by observable interfield competition.35 Thus,
it is uncertain whether oligopolistic pricing resultsY
The apparent lack of significant sales concentration does not
preclude the existence of barriers to entry or other forms of market
power in the producers. Since this is a "wasting asset" industry in
which supply is limited by nature, control over known reserves can
provide substantial market power by creating barriers to entry or
expansion. The only available data indicate that while concentration
in reserve ownership is somewhat higher than in sales, the level of
control does not appear threatening!'
The costs associated with exploration for new gas finds, leasing
mineral rights, and the inevitable dry holes constitute substantial
barriers to entry or expansion in the production of natural gas.
Because exploration costs must be financed predominantly from
24. This conclusion is based on the definitions and probable behavior patterns developed in J.
25-36 (1959).
25. See NEUNER 3542, 113-205.
26. Id. at 246-5 1. Only one of the area cases discusses concentration statistics for the area.
See Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Cases, No. AR64-1, at 8 (F.P.C. Sept. 16, 1968) (Hearing
Examiner's decision).
27. Neuner found no effect upon price in his study. NEUNER 256-64. See also MACAVOY 24365.
28. Using 1953 date and making several adjustments, Neuner, in his study, arrived at the
following figures:
5 largest holdings 27.0 to 31.1%
10 largest-holdings 34.9 to40.2%
15 largest holdings 39.5 to455%
25 largest holdings 45.6 to 52.5%
NEUNER 16-18. The first percentage includes reserves held by pipelines and their affiliates in the
total reserve figures. The second percentage in each column is figured without including the
pipeline reserves. Unfortunately, both the dated nature of the data and the enormous additions
to reserves since 1953 decrease the reliability of the figures above. Estimated reserves in 1953
were 211.5 trillion cubic feet (rcf). AM. GAS. J., March 1954, at 19. The cumulative discovered
gas in 1968 was 628.2 Tcf with 284.5 Tcf of that amount remaining as reserves. FPC BUREAU OF
NATURAL GAS, STAFF REPORT ON NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND 20 (1969).
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
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internal sources,29 the larger, established firm has a distinct
advantage. In addition, larger firms are able to buy up the mineral
rights leases at relatively low prices and control the exploration of
areas most likely to be productive well in advance of any actual
development in the locale.
Nevertheless, entry by a large number of small and new producers
in recent years suggests that these barriers have had little effect °
Their entry may be partially explained by two factors. First, the large
firms frequently support "wildcatting" by the small firms; this
enables the large firms to spread the cost of more speculative
exploration and later move in to help develop any significant findt
Second, since gas is almost always discovered in conjunction with oil
and other hydrocarbons, 32 about 75 percent of the costs of exploring
for and producing oil and gas are joint costs. Thus, the risk of
exploration may often be spread between oil and gas production,
encouraging exploration by both small and large firms.
In summary, the producer level appears to be neither monopolistic
nor oligopolistic in structure. Indeed, a strong argument can be made
that the market is monopsonistic with the pipeline purchasers
occupying a significantly superior bargaining position3 3 In 1957, four
interstate pipelines purchased 43.9 percent of the national sales
volume of natural gas and an even higher percentage from the major
producing areas of the South and Southwestfr Moreover, the buying
concentration in any particular field is probably even more
pronounced. Entry is highly restricted at the buyer level; to have
several pipelines serving each field would be economically wasteful.35
Despite this evidence that monopoly structure does not exist at the
producer level and that monopsonistic power may exist among
buyers, the suspicion persists that production level prices are not
29. "The risks of exploration are such that financial institutions will not lend money for this
purpose on the security of the assets that may be discovered by a proposed exploratory effort."
GARFIELD & Lovi.oy 334.
30. See GARFIELD& LovEJoy 320-21.

31. Id. at 321.
32. The natural result is that the major oil companies are also the largest gas producing
companies. Id. at 294-95, 317-21.
33. Id. at 323; MACAvoY 243.46. See generally NEUNER 125-34 (one pipeline constituted the
only major interstate buyer in the Permian area until at least 1952).
34. GARFIELD & Lovjoy 323.
35. For a description of various agreements designed to avoid waste and duplication by
sharing gathering facilities in the field, see Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., 22 F.P.C. 1091,
1111 (1959).
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entirely competitively set. The Federal Power Commission has so
found3 The suspicion that at least some produicers are making excess
profits is reinforced by the phenomenal increase in gas field price since
194531 and the relatively recent attempts to set prices in the new fields
at much higher rates than previously existed. While these instances
illustrate that the producers were able to negotiate a higher price than
the Commission staff thought reasonable on a cost basis, they do not
conclusively establish the unreasonableness of such negotiated prices
but merely demonstrate that the pipeline purchagers did not have, or
did not exercise, complete power in the pricing mechanism. Therefore,
an inquiry must be made into rigidities in the market that might
inhibit competitive pricing.
One such rigidity might be a lack of self-interest on the part of the
buyer, the pipeline, to force the price to its lowest possible level since
the pipeline knows that it can recover full cost of the gas as an expense
item in its rates to its own customers. An important-factor only after
World War II, the pipelines fought for a relatively limited supply of.
gas to meet the booming demand for fuels. Since the price of other
fuels was also increasing rapidly, natural gas producers could demand
extraordinary price increases, despite the monopsonistic or
oligopsonistic nature of the market?9 The only limit on producer
prices was the maximum price which could be exacted without losing
the consumer market to other fuels, and that maximum price may or
may not have had any relation to cost factors at the production level.
Absent monopoly power, prices should level off or decline as high
profits encourage the entry of additional suppliers to meet the
increased demand. If such circumstances persisted over a long period,
however, regulation of producer prices might well be justified despite
36. See Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159, 181-83 (1965). In fact,
however, it is an open question whether the Commission would have so held but for the Supreme
Court's Phillipsdecision requiring regulation. See notes 69-71 infra and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 17; Kitch, The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases and the
Regulatory Determination of Price, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 191, 196 (1967); Kitch, Regulation of
Field Market for NaturalGas by the FederalPower Commission, 11 J. LAw & EcoN. 243,26264 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kitch]. All of the authorities, except Professor Kahn and the
Permiancase itself, argue that the price increase was not traceable to monopolistic pricing.
38. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (CATCO);
Johnson, ProducerRate Regulation in Natural Gas Certification Proceedings: CATCO in
Context, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 771 (1962).

39. See Permian Basin Area Rate Proceedings, 34 F.P.C. 159, 182-83 (1965);
Lovaloy 319-20,325; NEUNER 119-23; Kitch 257-65.

GARFIELD &
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the lack of permanent monopoly power. 0 Whether a spiralling
producers' price exists today is difficult to determine since a
negotiated field price is no longer available for use as a reference
point' One dubious indication that field prices would have continued
to rise but for FPC-imposed ceilings is the producers' consistent
pressure for a higher ceiling 2 Moreover, contract prices at a rate
below the ceiling have continued to rise slightly.!'
On the other hand, the average price of gas at the wellhead seems
to have leveled off since 1960.14 Moreover, the pipelines have
apparently caught up with the abnormal increase in demand which
followed World War II. Finally, gas prices may have reached a
maximum relative to competitive fuels in many market areas. 5 Thus
for a pipeline to continue to grow at a desirable rate, it must seek to
cut its costs by bargaining for the cheapest possible price in the field.
However, several additional factors also suggest that pipelines
40. Public regulation may be necessary to prevent an economic rent or profit in excess of the
amount required to call forth the necessary supply during conditions of a relatively fixed supply
of a natural resource and an increasing demand. These excess profits are due to scarcity and may
occur in a competitive market with low factor mobility. See GARFIELD & LOVEJOY 323-24;
NEUNER xix. Kahn, supra note 17, at 506. Both MacAvoy and Kitch conclude that price control
excluding recovery of such profits may have an adverse effect upon exploration for new reserves
and allocation of the resource in general. MACAVOY 255-62; Kitch 276-80. These fears may have
been justified. The FPC staff has issued a report detailing a critical shortage in reserves and
emphasizing the need to induce substantial new exploration to avoid a gas shortage crisis in the
very near future. FPC BUREAU OF NATURAL GAS, STAFF REPORT ON NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY
AND DEMAND (1969). See also FORTUNE, Nov. 1969, at 120. The Commission has responded in
some measure. See notes 206-17 infra and accompanying text.
41. With the advent of the area cases in 1960, the Commission established ceiling prices based
upon the then existing field prices which were to be used until the area rate cases were concluded,
Thus the most recent reliable prices resulting from negotiations are almost ten years old. See
FPC Statement of General Policy, No.614, 18 C.F.R. § 2.56 (1970); 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).See
also Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
42. Recent statements by some distributors, traditionally influenced by consumer pressure to
seek lower prices, indicate that they too favor price increases to encourage exploration for
additional supply. See FORTUNE, Nov. 1969, at 120. Producers and pipelines have also tried
various devices to circumvent the price restrictions. For a description of these attempts and the
Commission's response, see Kitch 269-76.
43. See, e.g., FPC 1968 ANN. REP. 55-56.
44. See GARFIELD & LOvEJOY 325; Kitch 265.
45. She, e.g., Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. FPC, 374 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1967); Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. of America, 28 F.P.C. 731 (1962).See GARFIELD &LOVEJOY 325; Kitch 265-67. Cf.
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, supra note 5, at 15-46; FPC FEDERAL POWER SURVEY 12 (1964).
Gas companies have occasionally sought discriminatory pricing in order to compete with other
fuels. Recent evidence indicates that the cumulative residential and industrial demand for all
fuels continues unabated. Ehrich, A Shortage of Energy Threatens Industries and Homes
A cross U.S., The Wall St. Journal, June 2, 1970, at 1,col. 6.
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may have little or no incentive to bargain for lower prices. First,
distance and use factors significantly affect the level of competition

between fuels in any particular market. Second, pipelines owning
reserves may have an incentive to enhance the value of their reserves
by permitting higher prices for the independent producer! 6 Finally,
even assuming that the pipelines have an incentive to bargain for
lower prices, the competition with other fuels only places an upper

limit upon the field price. That price has no relationship to gas
production costs since cost factors in each competing fuel industry

will be quite different.
Another possible inhibition on competitive pricing is the

cooperative action among producers. Perhaps the most important
instance of cooperative effort, designed to spread the risk and to
amass the capital necessary for exploration and development, is the

joint leasing and early development of the fields with each producer
taking a pro rata share of expenses and returns!7 Nevertheless, these

cooperative arrangements should not make the industry oligopolistic
unless they involve the interaction of most of the producers in each
field and are dominated by the larger firms. Although no proof was

found, it seems highly probable that this latter situation in fact exists.
Another unique feature of the industry which may substantially

detract from competitive pricing is the widespread use of long-term
requirements contracts with built-in price adjustment clauses. Such

contracts preclude most possible competition between producers
except when a pipeline first moves into a field or undertakes a large
expansion project. Even if the pipelines attempt to play one producer
46. The Commission cited this possibility in the Permian decision. 34 F.P.C. 159, 182 (1965).
However, the Commission has subsequently actid to prevent the pipelines from recovering this
enhanced value in their own rates. See Pipeline Production Area Rate Proceeding, RP66-24,
FPC Op. No. 568, at 4 (Oct. 7, 1969) and cases cited there. See also GARFIELD & LOvEJOY 31112. The Commission has now applied the area rate approach to new gas supplies mooting the
question under discussion as to that component. Pipeline Production Area Rate Proceeding,
supra. However, the pipelines may be free to sell their reserves to an independent producer to
recover the enhanced value indirectly. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S.
635 (1945). But cf.Continental Oil Co., No. G2737, Op. No. 542, UTIL. L. REP. 10,957 (FPC,
June 27, 1968) (where pipelines sold production properties to independents and subsequently
purchased gas taken from the property, the pipeline was only entitled to a rate that reflected
original cost of the production property, rather than the price paid to the independent for the
gas).
47. These statements are based primarily upon information supplied by lawyers
knowledgeable in the area. Cf. GARFIELD & LovaioY 321-22. It seems odd that none of the
economic studies of the industry perused treated the importance of this upon the competitive
structure and conduct of the industry.
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against another to get the lowest price during these periods, the
pipelines frequently need such a great volume of gas that real

competition between producers is nonexistent. In a market where
buyers'are seeking a large product unit involving only a few sales

possibilities a year, the sellers are likely to act oligopolistically to
assure that each gets part of the market. Moreover, if no one seller can

satisfy the total demand for the product unit, cooperation among the
seller group to meet the demand is likely. Significant price
competition under these circumstances is unlikely. Typically covering

a period of twelve to twenty years, these large quantity contracts aim
to assure a supply to both the pipeline firms and their ultimate

consumers.!' To protect itself from rising costs and to assure that
it will get back any enhancement in the value of the gas over the
contract period,49 the producer typically seeks an escalation clause."0

Under the market conditions outlined above, the pipelines should
have been less willing to accept such provisions. However, at least

until the FPC prohibited non-cost-related provisions in future
contracts,.5 the pipelines continued to accept such clauses.
48. The FPC has consistently required a showing of adequate supply before it will certify a
pipeline project. Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 2 F.P.C. 29, 40 (1939). Initially demanding a
showing of adequate supply for twenty years, the Commission has more recently adopted a
method under which a twelve year contract is permissible. See GARFIELD & LovEioy 313-14.
Perhaps even a lesser showing may suffice. E.g., Texas-Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 22
F.P.C. 979,980-81 (19 5 9 ).See generally 1968 FPC ANN. REP. 48:
The Commission is continuing its policy of flexible gas reserves and deliverability
requirements for established pipelines with active gas procurement programs and for
pipelines extending into production areas where active exploration is continuing. This
reflects the FPC's continuing reliance on demonstrated management performance and
judgment in maintaining gas supplies. Id.
This relaxed standard for certification has probably had little actual impact on the normal
contract period since the pipelines will normally assure themselves of a long-term supply.
49. Note that while the producer's first goal is, of course, justifiable on cost grounds, the
second goal is not cost related, but value related.
50. Under a most favored nation clause, the most common escalation provision, the contract
price automatically increases if a new contract in the area is negotiated at a higher price.
Another example is a price redetermination clause providing for periodic renegotiation of price
throughout the term of the contract. See NEUNER 80-111. Thus the producer may exercise
substantial price control whenever uncommitted reserves exist in the area covered by the
contract. The producer may bargain on the price for uncommitted reserves to increase the field
price, thereby enhancing the price of the previously committed gas, regardless of his costs.
51. Non-acceptability of Contracts Between Producers and Interstate Natural-Gas
Companies Containing Certain Types of Automatic Escalation and Favored Nation Clauses, 25
F.P.C. 379 (1961), modified, 27 F.P.C. 339 (1962), 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1970). This
prohibition was approved in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964). See also Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 34 F.P.C. 159,236-37 (1965), affd, 390 U.S. 747,781-84 (1968).
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Another price phenomenon which may limit the effect of
anticompetitive practices is competition between fields. Substantial
evidence suggests that this exists although the producer-sellers
apparently 'still retain substantial price control. As a new field is
opened, a prevailing price is established for the initial purchases. The
price then begins to rise until it reaches a point where the pipeline can
get gas in another new field at a competitive price including the cost of
construction of the necessary new pipeline. The price in the older field
then stabilizes at the price level prevailing initially in the new field.
However, this equilibrium is short-lived. The process soon repeats
itself with the price in both the new and the old field rising again until
it reaches a level equivalent to that in yet another new field. Repetition
of this process results in a continual price rise in all fields.52
Another factor clearly affecting the market and price for gas is the
close production relationship to oil. For example, a firm engaged in
both oil and gas production may attempt to allocate'the greater share
of the joint production costs to whichever product faces the least
competitive pressure. Since oil industry competition has been
relatively intense in recent years, a disproportionate share of thejoint
production costs has likely been assigned to gas.53 Further, since gas
supply is significantly affected by exploration for and discovery of oil,
no completely reliable relationship exists between supply and demand
for gas. If there is no advantageous market for oil, a firm may be less
inclined to develop new wells merely to seek gas. The potential
influence of demand for oil on the gas supply is especially great in
fields like the Permian Area where predominantly associated gas is
produced.
Conclusions from this analysis of the economics of the gas market
are hazardous at best. However, it seems reasonably clear that the
industry is not monopolistic. While this does not necessarily mean
that a tree market would result in competitively set prices, it does
suggest that the market for gas at the production level is oligopolistic
at most and that perhaps no regulation of producer prices is
necessary.54 However, Congress has required such regulation. The
52. See NEUNER 65-70. However, Neuner did not conclude that this was the result of seller
pricing power.
53. See GARFIELD & LOVEJOY 324, 337. See also Kahn, supra note 17, at 510-17; FORTUNE,
Nov. 1969, at 120, 190; FORTUNE, June 1969, at 105, 109.
54. See, e.g.. MAcAVOY 4-8; NEUNER 280-90; Kitch at 243; Kitch, The Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases and the Regulatory Determination of Price, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 191 (1967).
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method of regulation adopted by the Commission to fulfill this
congressional mandate can now be tested in light of this economic
framework.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL REGULATION

Prior to 1938 the federal government did not directly regulate any
phase of the gas industry. Incidents of indirect control were evident in
the Connally "Hot Oil" Act,5 which affected production of
associated gas to the extent that it regulated oil production. The
Supreme Court as late as 1931, however, viewed production of gas as
a "mining operation" regulable only by the states5 6 The public utility
nature of the distribution process led early to local, and then state,
regulation at that level, and many of the producing states imposed
regulation in the interest of conserving the resource and stabilizing
the market. State regulatory efforts at both levels proved ineffective
as the industry grew. Price and service increasingly depended on
the practices of the interstate pipeline system over which the states
had no regulatory jurisdictionY?
In 1928 the Federal Trade Commission received congressional
authorization to investigate utility holding companies and suggest
remedial legislationY6 The Commission's report recommended
that
[a] Federal regulatory law should be enacted applicable to interstate natural
gas pipelines which transport gas for ultimate sales to and use by the public,
regulating contracts for purchase of gas to be transported interstate, or
regulating rates for carriage or city gate rates at the end of such transportation,
or all of these. Security issues, accounts, beginning and abandonment of
operations, and intercorporate relations of companies owning or controlling
gas-pipelines should also be regulatedP

This recommendation resulted in the enactment of the Natural
Gas Act of 19380 Administered by the Federal Power Commission,
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-7151(1964).

56. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1931).
57. Operation of the interstate pipelines involved interstate commerce over which, under the
prevailing view of the commerce clause, only Congress could exert control. Missouri ev rel.
Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924). See also East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 283 U.S. 465 (1931); Public Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S.
83 (1927); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); United Fuel Gas Co. v.
Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921); Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921);
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
58. S.REs. No. 83,70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CONG. REc. 3054 (1928).
59. S. Doc. No.92, 70th Cong., IstSess. pt. 84A, at 616-17 (1936).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1964).
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the Act contains four sections which are important for this article.
Section 1, establishing the jurisdictional guidelines, makes the Act
applicable to natural gas companies selling in interstate commerce,
Section 4 requires firms to file notice of rate changes and authorizes
the suspension of such changes for a five month period.62 Section 5
authorizes the Commission to investigate rates and to lower those
rates which are not just and reasonable!' Section 7 requires any firm
covered by the Act to secure a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Commission before entering into the gas business
or constructing any significant facility.64 I f a company fails to secure a
certificate or operates beyond the range of activity which the
certificate allows, the company may be prohibited from operating in
the natural gas industry.
In Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.'s the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The Court
reasoned that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress' commerce
power, at least as applied to firms transporting gas in interstate
commerce. The Court concluded, moreover, that the Act's regulatory
power extended to the production activity of integrated firms to the
66
extent that their gas eventually reached the interstate market.
Prior to 1954, production and sales by non-integrated firms were
not subject to regulation under the Act even though the firms' gas
entered interstate commerce immediately after the saleF7 The price
charged a pipeline company by an independent producer was an
expense item in the pipeline's rate-making formula.6 8 The
Commission generally failed to question the reasonableness of this
price in its regulation of the pipeline. As a result, the FPC controlled
only the price and costs of production by integrated producers. The
hiatus created by this dual regulatory approach prevented the
Commission from adopting a consistent policy; pressure to equalize
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. § 717.
Id. § 717c.
Id. § 717d.
Id. § 71717.
315 U.S. 575 (1942).
Id. at 582-83. The Court also held that regulation under the Act met the requirements of

due process. Id. at 583-85.
67. Columbia Fuel Corp., 2 F.P.C. 200,208 (1940). The Commission qualified its decision by
stating that if monopoly conditions existed in the industry at some future date, the question of
producer regulation wvould be reopened. Id.
68. See, e.g., GA)MELD & LovEioy 304.
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regulatory treatment of the two elements of the production industry

was inevitable.
fn 1954 the Supreme Court held that the Act's rate provisions also
applied to independent producers to the extent that their gas entered
interstate commerce!' Noting that the stated purpose of regulation is
"[p]rotection of consumers against exploitation at the hands of
natural gas companies,"7 the Court asserted that no justification
existed either in the Act or in the legislation's purpose upon which to

base different treatment of integrated and independent producers.
Thus, the Commission's jurisdiction was significantly changed,
requiring modifications in its regulatory scheme!'
REGULATION

O RATES PRIOR TO 1960

Ratemaking in the natural gas industry has posed a most
perplexing problem for the Federal Power Commission since its
inception. In 1898 in Smyth v. Ames,7 the landmark decision on
governmental control of rates, the Supreme Court held that a rate

should yield a return upon the fair value of the property being used for
the public convenience. The factors enunciated by the Court to
determine fair value included:
the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent
improvement, the amount and market value of the bonds and stocks, the
present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable
earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute,
and the sum required to meet operating expenses.. .P

In practice this suggestion was translated into a requirement that the

fair value of property must include consideration of: original cost plus
cost of improvements, less depreciation; current market value of the
69. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). The decision remains
controversial. For an argument that the legislative history of the Act does not support the
Court's decision and a description of the attempts at congressional reversal of the Phillips
decision, see Kitch 243,254-57.
70. 347 U.S. at 685.
71. The Phillips case involved sales following production, gathering, and processing.
Decisions following Phillips have extended federal regulatory control to sales of gas at the
wellhead. California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366,369 (1965) (dictum); Continental
Oil Co. v. FPC, 266 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959); Saturn Oil & Gas Co.
v. FPC, 250 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958); Shell Oil Co. v. FPC,
247 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1957); cf. United States Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381
U.S. 392 (1965).
72. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
73. Id. at 546-47.
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property; and current cost of reproducing the property.74 However, no
formula existed to indicate the relative importance of these often
conflicting factors.
This uncertainty over the propriety of a given rate structure,
created by attempts to reconcile basically inconsistent theories, led to
the brilliant concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Southwestern Belly5 Critical of determinations of the rate base from
estimates of the value of the assets employed in the public service, he
advocated the use of the rate base as "a fact, not determined as a
matter of opinion."76 His "prudent investment theory" attempted to
avoid the wild uncertainties of Smyth by determining precisely what
had been invested in the business and using that amount as the rate
base. Similarly, the theory adopted the readily-determinable amount
of the capital charge, both as to debt and equity, as the measure of the
rate of return. Reasserted frequently in minority opinions,77 Mr.
Justice Brandeis' prudent investment theory was finally adopted as
the governing standard by the FPC. 8
The Supreme Court upheld the use of the prudent investment
theory in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co."
Hope, an integrated natural gas company, was charged with exacting
unreasonable rates and discriminating in favor of industrial buyers.
In affirming the FPC's order that Hope reduce its rates, the Court
explicitly rejected the fair value approach and declared that "'fair
value' is the end product of the process of ratemaking not the starting
point ...

."I' The Court then attempted to delineate the judicial role

in passing upon rate questions.
It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect
of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry
under the Act is at an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that
74. See BONBRIGHT 163, 170; GARFIELD & LovaioY 58-60. See generally C. PHILLIPS, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 214-40 (1965); Hale, Conflicting Judicial Criteria of Utility
Rates- The NeedforJudicialRestatement, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1938).
75. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276,289 (1923).
76. Id. at 306.
77. See, e.g., McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419, 436 (1938) (dissenting
opinion); St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 488 (1929) (dissenting
opinion); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 421-22 (1926) (dissenting
opinion); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement CQ. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679
(1923) (concurring opinion).
78. Hope Natural Gas Co., 34 F.P.C. 150 (1942).
79. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
80. Id. at 601.
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result may contain infirmities is not then important . . . .And he who would
upset the rate order under the Act carries the heavy burden of making a
convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its
consequences!'

In this instance the "end result" doctrine reflects judicial deference to
administrative decision. By definition, however, the end result test is
not without standards. The rate must be sufficient to protect the
investor's legitimate interest in the financial integrity of the regulated
company by enabling the company to operate successfully and attract
capital. Furthermore, the investor should be assured that his return
will be commensurate with the return on investment of other
enterprises having corresponding risks8 2 The Court concluded that
rates meeting these requirements "certainly cannot be condemned as
invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return on the
so-called 'fair value' rate base."83
In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Jackson expressed two primary
concerns. Noting first that natural gas is a,wasting asset of limited
supply, he contended that price regulation should place particular
emphasis upon conservation through a pricing policy that would
encourage the use of natural gas when its social and economic return
to the public is high and discourage use where the social utility is low.
Preservation of existing supply for optimal uses, he noted, should be
the first concern of regulation!' The idea that regulatory control over
prices should be adapted to achieve social and economic goals, other
than seeking the lowest price to the consumer consistent with a fair
return to the investor, was novel in the Supreme Court. While Mr.
Justice Jackson's views on the necessity of conserving gas resources
may have been overstated in light of subsequent large discoveries, his
utilitarian or functional approach to ratemaking is still important.
His second attack upon the majority's acceptance of the prudent
investment theory centered upon his view that the production aspect
of the gas industry did not fit the economic model of a public utility.8 '
Therefore, he contended, the "fair return on investment" theory with
its requisite determination of a rate base was not really effective in
arriving at a proper price. Under his view the industry possessed two
8.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 634-35.
Id. at 628-60.
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diverse facets--production and transportation. The transportation
component, he acknowledged, involved an operation "not differing
substantially" from many other utility activities. In this situation,
the consumer receives none of the company's phy.ical property but
only utilizes it. Moreover, the difficulty of appraising the value of
the "intangible service" provided by the pipeline in a monopoly or
near monopoly context, is manifest. Since the service of such a
utility relates to the company's capital investment, he concluded, a
"rate base calculated on the prudent investment formula [through
valuation of the assets involved] would seem a reasonably satisfactory measure for' fixing a return from [the transportation]
branch of the business ...
."8
He argued, however, that the prudent investment theory was not
intended nor well suited for application to the production phase of the
natural gas industry because of the inherent uncertainty of that
processY The cost of discovering gas and reducing' it to possession
fluctuates widely depending on the vicissitudes of discovery, largely
uncontrollable by even the most efficient methods!' This makes a rate
base determination hazardous at best, because of the difficulty of
assigning value to such intangibles as the leaseholds and freeholds
where attempted discovery might or might not be successful. Using a
prudent investment theory, he contended, ignores these varying costs
of discovery and leads to widely divergent returns unrelated to the
value of the gas to the consumer. In terms of consumer interest, Mr.
Justice Jackson felt that producers should not receive different prices
for the same product simply because the total production costs varied,
a result of varying amounts of capital investment. "The service
one renders to society in the gas business is measured by what he gets
out of the ground, not by what he puts into it ...
."" Consequently,.
Mr. Justice Jackson preferred use of the market price of the gas in the
field, not the rate base, as the measure of the portion of the rate not
86. Id. at 647.
87. In short, he contended,
[tihe prudent investment theory has relative merits in- fixing rates for a utility which
creates its service merely by its investment. The amount and quality of service rendered
by the usual utility will . . . be measured by the amount of capital it puts into the
enterprise. But it has no rational application where there is no such relationship between
investment and capacity to serve. There is no such relationship between investment and
the amount of gas produced. Id. at 649.
88. Id. See also OIL GAS J., Apr. 24, 1961, at 92.
89. 320 U.S. at 649.
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associated with the transportation function. "Gas itself is tangible,
possessible, and does have a market and a price in the field. The value
of the rate base is more elusive than that of gas."9 This approach
assumes a more or less competitive market for gas in the field to
protect the consumers' interest.
Consistent with the Court's statement in Hope that it would only
scrutinize the end result of the method of rate control the Commission
used, the following year the Court implied that it might affirm use of
the field price approach if it were adopted by the Commission. In
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission,9' the
Commission had included the company's producing properties in its
rate base at their net original cost. The company argued that the
correct procedure would adopt instead the "fair field price of the gas
as a commodity" in computing operating expenses. Although this
argument was rejected as inconsistent with the legislative history of
the Act, the Court added that "[w]e do not say that the Commission
lacks the authority to depart from the rate base method. We only hold
that the Commission is not precluded from using it." Mr. Justice
Jackson again dissented in opposition to the reliance on the value of
3
production properties in the rate base determination
Eventually influenced by Mr. Justice Jackson's approach, the
Commission adopted the field price concept in 1954 in passing upon
the production component of the rates of an integrated producerpipeline. 4 This conversion to the field price theory was probably
occasioned by two factors. First, the company was able to convince
the Commission that discovery was being deterred and "conservation
in both production and use" was not being accomplished by the
depressed prices resulting from the rate base method9 The second
factor influencing the Commission may have been its increased
workload under the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips." With the
spectre of having to set rates for all independent as well as integrated
90. Id. at 648.
91. 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
92. Id. at 601.
93. Id. at 610-11.
94. Panhandle Pipeline Co., 13 F.P.C. 53 (1954). The Commission's field price was based
upon the "weighted arm's length prices" established by federally unregulated independent
producers for similar gas in the fields. This price was multiplied by the volume produced and
included in operating expenses.
95. Id. at 74-75.
96. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
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producers, the Commission may well have been searching for a more
efficient method to dispose of rate cases than was possible under the
traditional approach which required a case-by-case rate-base
determination for each producer.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was not
persuaded, however. Relying upon the Hope opinion, the court
rejected the Commission's justification for converting to the field
price method in City of Detroit v. Federal Power Commission 7
While the court admitted that "allowance of a field price for the
utility's own produced gas as an element in the ultimate composition
of rates is not unlawful merely because it departs from the traditional
rate-base method," it held that the Commission had not justified its
position in terms of protecting the consumer interest, its primary
responsibility under the Act." The court added that
it is essential in such a case as this that [the rate-base method] be used as a basis
of comparison. . . . Unless it is. .. used at least as a point of departure, the
whole experience under the Act is discarded and no anchor . . . is available
• . . to hold the terms "just and reasonable" to some recognizable meaning. 9

00
On remand the Commission reverted to the rate-base method.
The Fifth Circuit was confronted with a similar issue in Bel Oil
Corp. v. FederalPower Commission.1 1 Agreeing essentially with City
of Detroit, the court held that the evidence concerning typical field
prices coupled with expert testimony asserting the need for an
incentive price to encourage exploratory and development activity was
insufficient to demonstrate that the resulting rates were just and
reasonable. However, the court indicated that cost evidence might be
sufficient in some circumstances to insure just and reasonable rates
and suggested that the Commission need not fix separate rates for
each producer if a uniform rate for the field was found to be more
desirable.
Although these decisions involved int6grated companies, they are
equally applicable to independent producers. The real thrust of the
opinion's suggests that, in justifying an increase in rates, the
traditional rate base computations must be used as a point of
departure.

97. 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
98. Id.at815-17.
99. Id. at 818-19.
100. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 25 F.P.C. 784 (1961).
101. 255 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958).

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

(Vol. 1970:653

EVOLUTION OF THE AREA APPROACH

The FPC's new jurisdictional coverage under the Phillips
decision' required the regulation of interstate sales made by
independent producers and was accompanied by the onus of an
immense increase in administrative workload. Producer compliance
with the Commission's order pursuant to the Phillips holding resulted
in an enormous influx of applications for certificates of public
convenience and necessity.0 3 Filing of the rate applications required

by section 4 of the Act increased in like manner.'" 4 This great
regulatory morass signalled the need to seek another approach,

especially since the courts had precluded the field price method.
An indication of a new approach arose in section 7 proceedings
upon applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity.
The Commission was faced with the responsibility of expeditiously
handling countless license applications-attributable to the enormous

increase in the demand for gas,'05 while at the same time assuring a

reasonable price for gas at the production level. If the licensing

process had to await a section 4 rate valuation, the immediate demand
for gas could not be met. A solution to the dilemma was found in
section 7(e) of the Act which empowers the Commission to issue a
certificate on "such reasonable terms and conditions as the public
convenience and necessity may require."'' In Cities Service Gas
Co.,107 the Commission conditioned issuance of a certificate upon
establishment of a gas price at the production level not to exceed the

price level prevalent in the area. Thus, the Commission successfully
resorted to at least an average field price theory, although only as a
102. See notes 69-7 1 supra and accompanying text.
103. From 1942 to 1954, the total number of certificate applications was 1,244. In a single
year following the decision, the FPC received 6,047 applications from independent producers
alone. Connole, GeneralConsiderations:A Nation'sNatural Gas Pains,44 GEo. L.J. 555, 55960(1956).
104. Prior to Phillips, the annual number of rate filings amounted to approximately 700. In
the first year after Phillips, utilities presented over 11,000 rate filings and 2,000 supplementary
filings proposing either rate increases or modification of existing rate schedules. Id. By 1960, a
large number of rate filings had accumulated awaiting final disposition. The supplements alone
totalled over 33,000. GARFELD & LovEjoY 330.
105. See Ross, The Area Rate Proceedings:An Unsettled Experiment in Public Control of
NaturalGas Prices, 18 Sw.L.J. 165, 170 (1964).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1964).
107. 14 F.P.C. 134 (1955).
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temporary measure to expedite licensing. The Commission's use of
field price for this purpose was affirmed.""
The "CATCO" litigation,"
certainly an illustration of
administration at its low ebb, resulted in an implicit affirmance by the
Supreme Court of the CitiesService approach. The Commission had
initially imposed conditions similar to those adopted in Cities
Service."' However, when the producers threatened to cancel their
existing sales agreement and sell their 1.67 trillion cubic feet of gas in
the intrastate market if the price conditions were imposed on
interstate sales, the Commission capitulated and withdrew the
conditions."' The Supreme Court reversed," 2 holding that the
Commission was obligated to impose an initial price in the public
interest when the price negotiated between the producer and the
pipeline was significantly "out of line" with the general field price in
the area of production.
Now clearly faced with both the burden imposed by Phillips and
the onus of conditioning initial licensing to assure reasonable
temporary rates pending a detailed section 4 proceeding, the
Commission decided to undertake a wholly new approach. In 1960,
shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in CA TCO, the
Commission announced its adoption of an area rate approach
containing elements of both the rate base and field price methods."3
In detailing the reasons why the individual cost-of-service
approach did not satisfy the objectives of effective regulation," 4 the
Commission specifically observed that return had no logical or
rational relation to investment. In addition, the Commission noted
that the cost-of-service approach provided no incentive or reward for
the efficient, pioneering, or even lucky producer. Further, the
individual cost-of-service approach created incentives toward sales
policies that unfairly inflate the ultimate price to.the consumer. First,
the approach encouraged the producer to sell his highest cost gas to
108. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923
(1957). This case was decided between City of Detroit and Bel Oil. See notes 97 & 101 supra.
109. CATCO is a term used to refer collectively to the oil companies involved in a series of

related cases. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 380 n.2 (1959).
110. Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 563, modified, 17 F.P.C. 732 (1957).
111.Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 880 (1957).
112. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959). The Court's reasoning
was very similar to that adopted by the FPC in Cities Service and the initial CA TCO order.
113. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
114. Id. at 544-47.
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the interstate market, saving gas produced at a lower cost to be sold in
the unregulated intrastate market. In this manner, the firm could
maximize its profit. Second, since royalties to the lessor of gasproducing lands are usually based upon a percentage of the price the
producer eventually receives, the lessor would want to lease to the
highest cost producers in order to maximize royalties. This practice
placed significant upward pressure on prices generally by increasing
the lease price to the more efficient producer.
Another problem detailed by the Commission was the difficulty of
assigning joint costs between oil and gas and between intrastate and
interstate gas. Under an individual cost-of-service approach, such
allocation was crucial. Additional uncertainty arose from the virtual
impossibility of predicting the quantity, quality, and resulting value of
reserves for purposes of establishing the rate base. Finally, tax
uncertainties presented significant problems in arriving at a unit cost.
Most significantly, the price determined by application of an
individual firm cost-of-service method had no relationship to the
value of the product to the consumer. For example, the Commission
observed, much gas is produced from wells owned jointly by several
producers. Since each producer had different overall costs, the price of
units of gas from the same well varied tremendously depending not
upon any difference in the gas but upon the cost characteristics of the
particular producer-seller. Indeed, the Commission found in several
instances that the firms were significantly underpricing their gas on a
cost basis because the market would not support a price reflecting
individual cost.
In addition to these economic arguments, the Commission relied
heavily upon the administrative burden occasioned by application of
individual firm cost-of-service to the multitude of independent
producers. It concluded that
effective regulation of the price of natural gas must be on some more
manageable plan that [sic] the rate base method . . . . [T]he better method
would be to establish fair prices for the gas itself . . . based on reasonable
financial requirements of the industry and not on the particular rate base and
expenses of each natural gas company."'

The Commission preliminarily designated twenty-three areas,
noting that future inquiry into the *appropriate economic and cost
115. Id. at 547.
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6
factors might cause a reorganization of the geographical divisions."
In addition the Commission established interim area "rate guiidance
levels" based upon historic cost, demand, and price trends in the area
to serve until the area proceedings could be concluded." 7 The
Commission then proceeded to terminate the individual producer
investigations, many of them pending since the Phillips decision in
1954, and set all of these cases for hearing under the new area rate
approach.
Phillips Petroleum, whose rates were still awaiting final
determination following the remand from the 1954 decision,
contended that abandonment of the traditional method was not
permitted by the Act. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the
order, permitting the Commission to proceed in working out the area
approach."' The Court stated that rigid adherence to a particular
method of rate regulation to the extent that any other method was
unlikely to be sustained "would be wholly out of keeping with this
Court's consistent and clearly articulated approach to the question of
the Commission's power to regulate rates.""' 9 The Court also
affirmed the imposition of the interim rates but reserved final
approval of the area approach until a completed area proceeding was
brought before it for review. Nevertheless, the Court's recognition of
to let the
the problem that the Commission was facing and its decision
20
agency experiment with the new approach were significant.
The details of the area approach, as well as its underlying
justification and legality, still remained for resolution in the area
proceedings themselves. Sharp disagreement existed between
producers, pipelines, ultimate consumers, economists, and the
Commission's staff over these issues. The first forum for airing such
disagreements before the Commission was the Permian Basin Area
2
Rate Proceeding. '

116. FPC, Statement of Gen. Policy No. 61-1, 18 C.F.R. § 2.56 (1970); 24 F.P.C. 818

(1960).
117. These interim rates did not purport to be "just and reasonable" rates. The guideline
prices were of two types: "initial service rates" applicable to rates proposed for sales under new
contracts and "increased rates" applicable to proposed increases in rates charged under existing

contracts.
118. Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1964).
119. Id. at 309.
120. The Court stated: "We respect the Commission's considered judgment backed by sound
and persuasive reasoning that the individual company cost-of-service method is not a feasible or
suitable one for regulating the rates of independent producers. We share the Commission's
hopes that the area approach may prove to be the ultimate solution." Id. at 3 10.
121. 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965).
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THE PERMIAN BASIN CASE

The Permian Basin is a major petroleum producing area
underlying much of Western Texas and Southeastern New Mexico,
rich in conjuctive gas and oil deposits, and accounting for
approximately I1 percent of all gas moving in the interstate market.
Prices for gas at the wellhead in the Permian region have historically
been lower than those in other areas of the country for a variety of
reasons. 23 Most Permian gas is associated gas, the reservoirs
composed of oil and gas at a volume ratio of two to one.124 Such
gas usually is of lower quality than that in other areas.
Moreover, the Permian Basin was discovered and substantially
developed before the pronounced increase in prices experienced during
the 1950's. Since costs are to some extent related to the value of the
product, the original costs in the Permian area were probably
relatively low, and this was reflected in field prices. Distance from the
market had increased transportation costs and thereby held the Field
price down. In addition, prices in the Permian Basin, unlike many
other fields, had already been subjected to substantial regulation since
a relatively large amount of gas was produced by integrated pipeline
producer firms.'1
The Federal Power Commission's decision finalized the adoption
of an area approach. Reiterating its view that rate determination
based upon each individual firm's cost-of-service was both
administratively unworkable and inconsistent with the goals of rate
regulation,' 2 the FPC flatly rejected, however, the use of freely
negotiated prices as the sole determinant of the proper rate. 2 While

the importance of adequate reserves was recognized, the Commission
did not accept the argument that a low reserves-to-production ratio

"'justifies the existing and future contract prices, whatever they may

be.'"12

122. Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159, 173 (1965).
123. Id. at 174.See also NEUNER 125-26.
124. 34 F.P.C. at 173. The national average is one to two. Id.
125. Id. at 252-53 (Commissioner O'Conner's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
126. Id. at 179.
127. "[O]ur examination of the contract prices of the gas producers is only the beginning and
not the end of our task in establishing the proper criterion for determining just and reasonable
rates." Id. at 183.
128. Id. at 185. For an interesting sequel to the reserve-exploration incentive problems, see
notes 206-22 infra and accompanying text.
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In general, the Commission adapted the individual firm cost-ofservice method in detailing its area approach. 129 Utilizing the
composite data at hand to figure the average cost of "plant" and the
average expenses per unit of gas produced, the FPC then determined a
fair rate of return and applied this to the average rate base. The result
was a per unit price that would provide a fair return on the average
investment and recovery of average expenses. This price was adopted
as the maximum rate chargeable by any firm in the area. Thus, in
theory at least," the new approach was still grounded on a cost-ofservice rationale. The Commission did mention that certain other
factors might be relevant in the determination of the price for each
particular area. "The factors which are commonly considered in the
design of rates include the impact of the prescribed rate on existing
rate structures, the quality of the gas in the area, the historical prices
in the area and other such factors."' 13 However, the Commission did
not employ such non-cost factors in its Permian decision,13 ' but
decided to use a multiple price approach, setting one price based upon
historic costs for old gas-well gas 32 and a higher ceiling price for new
gas-well gas. The latter higher price was adopted to promote the
exploration for, discovery of, and development of further reserves.
This price incentive was not provided for "flowing gas," defined to
include gas-well gas already dedicated to the interstate market by
contract and oil associate gas whether dedicated or not, since this gas
was either already discovered or exploration was so related to oil
33
production that the price incentive would have little impact.
Although the rate on new gas-well gas had functional purposes not
directly related to costs, the Commission adopted an objective
129. Pursuant to its order establishing the area rate proceedings, the Commission distributed

questionnaires to all producers, soliciting information on cost and operating experience in both
the particular area and nationwide. 26 F.P.C. 247, modified, 26 F.P.C. 514 (1961). It also
annotnced that individual company costs of service evidence would not be received in the
proceeding, but only composite industry and area cost studies. 25 F.P.C. 614 (1961), modifed,
26 F.P.C. 943 (1962).
130. 34 F.P.C. at 207.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 185-89. Originally gas moving under contracts filed with the Commission before
January 1, 1961, and all associated gas was classified as old gas; gas-well gas moving under
contracts filed on or after that date'was new gas. Recently, however, the Commission has
changed the application of the terms to provide an additional incentive to new discovery and
production. Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Proceeding, Nos. AR64-1, 61-1,& 61-2. FPC No.
567, Oct. 3, 1969. See note 208 infra and accompanying text.
133. 34 F.P.C. at 208-12.
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standard based upon cost for determining the higher, incentive

price. 3 For this gas the Commission used the 1960 nationwide
composite current costs.13 The Commission's uniform ceiling price
for flowing gas, however, was based on the composite historic cost of

the gas produced. 37 In determining the appropriate rate of return, the
Commission was guided by the standard enunciated in Hope: a return

sufficient to attract new capital in light of the risks inherent in the
investment and sufficient to assure confidence in the financial

integrity of the enterprise.'3 Aware of the independent producer's
unique market position and the risks he faces, the Commission
established a 12 percent rate of return for new gas-well gas.', The

same rate was established for flowing gas, since the lesser risk
involved in discovery was thought to be counterbalanced by the

greater risk in the pronounced below-pipeline quality of flowing gas in
the Permian Basin.' 0 Through this process, the Commission arrived
at a base ceiling price of 16.4 cents per thousand cubic feet (Mel) for
new gas-well gas and 14.5 cents per Mcf for all other gas.

Another issue considered by the Commission was whether the
ceiling price should vary depending upon the quality of the gas. It

concluded that since productivity is what is ultimately purchased, a
differential is necessary to reflect the energy content of new gas-well
gas. "' Sour gas, gas with impurities, costs the same as quality gas to
134. Id. at 185-88.
135. The Commission used nationwide, rather than area, data because exploration is 'carried
on nationwide, area data was incomplete or non-existent, and there was no indication that these
costs were out of line with costs in the Permian Basin.
136. The most important components in the pricing of both old and new gas was the cost of
exploration, development, and production. Other cost factors ultimately affect the regulated
price, such as administrative and regulatory expenses, but their effect for purposes of this article
is not significant.
137. Data on the actual cost of bringing forth the gas over the years were provided in the
questionnaires returned by forty-two relatively large producers in the area in response to the
FPC's request. See note 129 supra. The small producers, for the most part, failed to submit such
statistics. 34 F.P.C. at 214. The hearing examiner determined historic costs somewhat
differently, taking 1960 costs for new gas-well gas and back-trending them on the basis of
evidence of price trends over the period. Id. at 212-13, 218-20. The Commission rejected this
"estimate" approach in favor of the staff's actual data but did use the hearing examiners
conclusions to check on the validity of the staff's conclusion. Id. at 212-13. The Commission
found that the two different approaches resulted in strikingly similar ultimate cost estimates. Id.
at 212.
138. 34 F.P.C. at 200.
139. Id. at 204.
140. Id. at 215.
141. Id. at 223.
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discover and produce but is usually sold for less in the field because it
will require refining. Moreover, a producer could circumvent the area
price ceiling in practice if it could dilute the BTU content of the gas
and still command the same price. The Commission determined the
weighted average BTU content for gas-well gas in the Permian Basin
and provided for upward and downward adjustments in price
depending upon the premium or deficient nature of the gas.12 This is
the one instance in which the Commission seemed to be relying on a
value-rather than a cost-rationale. The Commission decided such a
provision was unnecessary for flowing gas since similar treatment had
been provided for in the existing contracts.113 Nothing indicated that
the absence of such a provision in the rate order would affect price.
The Commission stated, however, that the matter would be
reconsidered if such an effect were later apparent.'
The Commission also established a minimum rate below which no
interstate sale could be made, if'respective of existing contract
terms.' This was designed to rectify the situation whereby many
producers had contractually precluded themselves from obtaining an
increase in the price of their gas despite substantial increases in costs.
Without a minimum price order, the Commission asserted, the lower
priced gas would not pay its fair share of current costs and such loss
would either have to be recovered as part of the cost of gas not subject
to such contracts or out of the investor's pocket. Either alternative
would be inequitable to both investors and consumers of the higher
priced gas. Moreover, prescription of a minimum rate was considered
consistent with the theory underlying area rate regulation since it
would encourage exploration and development activity by producers
subject to such contracts who might otherwise have been deterred.
Existing contract prices between the minimum and maximum set by
the Commission were left intact. Any contractually permissible
increase within this range required only that the firm file the new rate
under the normal section 4 procedure.'
142. Id. at 221-25. Small producers were exempted from these price variations. Id. at 225.

143. Id. at 221. See also GARFIELD & LovEjoy 343.
144. 34 F.P.C. at 223.
145. Id. at 231.
146. Id. at 227-32. However, small producers, defined as those natural gas companies selling

less than 10,000 Mcf annually in interstate commerce, were exempted from the rate increase
filing requirements of the act so long as their new rates did not exceed the maximum. They only
had to submit an annual report stating the total volume ofjurisdictional sales and certify that all
sales were made at prices at or under the area ceiling. Id. at 235-36.
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The Commission also proscribed favored nation and spiral
escalation clauses in sales contracts in situations where exercise of
these clauses would set the price above the applicable area ceiling. 47
Finally, the Commission provided that any producer who was being
injured as a result of the imposition of the area rate could petition for
individual relief.1 18 The Commission did not specify the "exceptional
conditions" which would merit relief from the area rate, noting only
that complaints would be examined on a case-by-case basis. A
moratorium of two and one-half years was imposed on filing of
increases above the ceiling price' to promote effective implementation of the area approach.
Perhaps the first step in analyzing the decision to adopt area
pricing is to understand that the Commission retained a cost-ofservice approach at least to justify its actions- rather than utilize the
value-of-service rationale proposed in Mr. Justice Jackson's Hope
dissent. Even where a functional element was interjected into pricing
by adoption of the multiple price proposals, the Commission carefully
justified the approach on a cost basis. It simply used different costs to
justify the different rates. Thus the new approach clearly fails to meet
all of the stated objections to the individual firm cost-of-service
method. Group rates do not provide a rational relationship between
return and investment for individual firms. While the area approach
may build in an incentive toward efficiency and innovation, it
provides only a partial remedy for the problem of producer sales of
lower cost gas to the intrastate market and ignores the problem of
joint cost assignment. 150 Although the approach minimizes the
financial impact of reserve valuation on any one firm, it provides no
greater certainty in valuing those reserves. Moreover, while the group
method does avoid the anomaly of selling identical units of gas from
the same well at different prices, it still establishes no direct
147. Id. at 236-37.
148. Id. at 227.
149. Id. at 227-31.
150. Because of the difficulty of apportioning costs between gas and oil, the Commission
simply adopted gas-well gas costs as the assumed costs of associate gas. Reasoning that some of
the costs would have to be attributed to and recovered by the sale of oil, the Commission
asserted that the average cost of associate gas would not be higher and that the producers would
not be hurt by this treatment. 34 F.P.C. at 212-13, 217-18. This argument seems persuasive to
calm fears that the price was too low to meet producer costs on associate gas but raises the

possibility that the maximum price might be too high and not adequately protective of the
consumer interest. See generally Kahn, supra note 17, at 510-17.
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relationship between price and value to the consumer. Finally, the
group method has no direct impact on the conservation problems
which concerned Mr. Justice Jackson and does not purport to effect
socially desirable end uses. Indeed, one commentator persuasively
argued that the area price approach actually deters conservation"
The area method does undoubtedly take great strides toward
solving the administrative log jam besetting the Commission. While
this may furnish the best justification available for the approach, it is
neither cost nor value related except to the extent that the minor
savings in administrative costs are passed on to the consumer both in
the form of lower prices and a reduced drain on the federal budget.
One suspects that the administrative problems may have dictated
substantive policy with "the tail wagging the dog." Nevertheless, in
view of the alternatives available to the Commission, administrative
efficiency may be an adequate justification.
The Commission could have proposed no regulation at all
or-what is the same thing-it could have adopted field prices. This
"solution" is not totally satisfactory. Many, including the
Commission and perhaps the Court, believe that competition does not
in fact keep field prices at the lowest reasonable level. Once this
conclusion is reached, the Commission must come up with some
workable system of regulation. Second, whether one agrees with the
decision or not, the Supreme Court held in Phillips that Congress
commanded the Commission to regulate price. Moreover, the lower
courts have held in Bel Oil and City of Detroit that use of field
price-unless related in some explicit way to the public interest-does
not satisfy this command. Since Congress has not responded to those
decisions by amending the Natural Gas Act, the Commission would
not likely try to get these decisions overruled even if a sufficient record
assured success.
Obviously the Commission could not retain individual firm
regulation. Some form of group approach, based either upon cost or
value, was the only realistic alternative. While perhaps desirable in the
abstract, a group approach based upon value raises very difficult
problems since no readily available objective standard exists for
151. See Kitch 243, 278-80. Under the area approach, high cost gas will likely be left for
future generations to produce, use, and pay for. This results in two ways: High cost drilling is
deterred, and producing wells are likely to be capped earlier as the cost of extraction increases
toward the end of the well's life; if the price of gas is held below its market value, it will be used
for lesser uses, thus dissipating reserves available for future optimum uses.
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arriving at a result. Determining the social value of various kinds of
service and deriving the price required to attain that service is virtually
impossible. The additional problem of ordering priorities of use, often
subject to the influence of competing political pressures, creates
further complications. Moreover, the Commission would probably
have to exercise some control at the distribution level to make such a
pricing system work. Finally, the financial integrity of the producers
would require consideration in order to avoid the problem of
confiscation. Therefore, short of nationalization of the industry, cost
must still be the major element in arriving at the minimum price.
Economic prognostication, let alone the political system, is incapable
of reconciling these diverse objectives on any kind of rational basis.
At best, the Commission would intuitively set the price based upon
what it thought was necessary to produce certain desired market
phenomena. Such an approach could be evaluated only after the fact,
which normally would be too late.
Perhaps one can appreciate the difficulty of a value oriented
approach by trying to visualize a court i'eviewing the Commission's
decision to determine whether a price is reasonable. The court could
do little more than accept the Commission's word for the
reasonableness of the relationship between the ends that the
Commission sought and the price that it had speculatively set to
achieve those ends. Future economists may be able to master these
problems; at present, however, they are able to do little more than
identify past mistakes and predict future developments in broad
outline. This is not to suggest that the FPC should never let specific
functional objectives alter the result of their pricing system. While the
Commission did not utilize functional objectives in its Permian
decision, it has subsequently employed some functional pricing.' In
summary, the Commission's cost-based area approach satisfies
some-but not all-of the theoretical economic objections to
traditional pricing, provides an incentive for efficiency and
innovation, relieves the burden on administration, and provides a
reasonably workable, relative standard for testing reasonableness.
Moreover, assuming that the Commission possessed adequate and
accurate cost statistics and that it makes price adjustments as these
statistics change in the future, the results of the area approach should
not be strikingly different from the results under freely bargained-for
152. See notes 208-22 infra and accompanying text.
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field prices if the field prices are truly competitively set. The field price
under pure competition should be at or near the lowest price that will
cover costs and provide the minimum profit necessary to attract
capital. Under workable competition, the field price approximates
estimates of long-run average costs. In either case, a firm with
abnormally high costs would either have to take a loss or go out of
business. It would be precluded from charging a price above the
ceiling set by the lower cost firms. Certainly, regulatory price
response may lag behind price changes in the marketplace. However,
it seems probable that a regulated price ceiling based upon historic
and current costs would not vary widely from a competitively-set
ceiling, at least if the market situation were relatively stable. In fact,
the regulated area rate may be higher since the Commission did not
consider competitive pressures and gave the producers the benefit of
the doubt on virtually every contested cost factor. This analysis, if
valid, suggests that producer objection to the area approach was at
least partially premised upon the producers' belief that field price is
not rigidly limited by competition.
Professor Kitch has advanced the thesis that the Commission's
53
approach is not traditional price regulation at all but a price freeze.
Contending that the Commission's method was only rationalized in
terms of costs, he asserts that the FPC was in reality freezing the price
at the 1959-1960 level in order to hold down prices to ultimate consumers irrespective of cost or value considerations. Characterization
of the Commission's approach as a price freeze, however, seems to
obfuscate analysis. First, Professor Kitch's use of the term "price
freeze" is unclear. If he was suggesting an absolute bar on price
increases, he is correct that such action is unprecedented in normal
regulatory ratemaking. 151 However, except for the moratorium
period, this conclusion is difficult to support. Indeed, Professor
Kitch's later discussion is not consistent with this interpretation. The
Commission did premise its price on cost and provided for price
adjustments to meet future cost increases. While regulatory response
to cost changes in the future may be delayed, the same could be said of
any regulation of price and provides no reason to conclude that
adjustments will not be made. The genuine nature of the
153. Kitch 244-46.
154. An absolute bar on price increases has been utilized only in emergency situations and in
the case of agriculture and urban housing where price freezes were in response to overwhelming

political pressure or dislocation caused by war.
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Commission's general commitment to a cost premise is illustrated by
the variations found in the later area cases. 5 It is too early to accuse
the Commission of bad faith.
On the other hand, perhaps Professor Kitch meant that the value
of the rate base was frozen, and therefore price would not be
responsive to market needs and changes. While this is true for
previously discovered gas, it is not valid for future discoveries except
to the extent of regulatory lag in price increases attributable to
increased costs. This interpretation is consistent with the rest of the
Kitch article but is not consistent with his statement that such a
"freeze" is unprecedented. All ratemaking under the cost-ofservice method freezes the rate base evaluation at its original cost.
The only difference between the traditional use of such a "freeze" and
that employed in Permian relates to the content of the rate base. In
Permian the bulk of the rate base is made up of the exploration and
development costs even though the product may not be sold for some
years. While there is some legitimate question as to whether and how
these costs should be capitalized, Professor Kitch does not seem to be
concerned with that problem. Otherwise, the "freeze" on rate base is
clearly consistent with traditional cost-of-service ratemaking, and his
statement that this is unprecedented makes little sense. This is clearly
not the kind of parity pricing involved in agriculture or the freeze on
prices and rent invoked during wartime.
Whatever he meant by the term "price freeze," Professor Kitch
does suggest some very persuasive objections to the area approach.
His apparent solution, however, lies in eliminating regulation
completely rather than in modifying the existing regulatory scheme.
At this point in history, that argument must be addressed to
Congress; it does not seem very helpful for the Commission's use. His
primary concern is that regulation alters the natural relation between
supply and demand and will therefore distort development of the most
desirable policies within the industry in terms of both economics and
conservation. This conclusion is based on the premise that the
industry would operate reasonably competitively without regulation,
thus bringing price, supply, and demand into an optimum
relationship. Sufficient evidence to support this premise is lacking. In
structural terms, the supporting economic analysis ignores important
unique features of the gas industry which may affect the degree of
155. See notes 202-22 infra and accompanying text.
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competition. Similarly, the evidence supplied by actual conduct is
inconclusive since it was collected while the market was in an

abnormal period of growth. Moreover, there was no independent
market to be used as a test after 1960.

In affirming the Commission's adoption of a general area
approach, the Court accorded the Commission what may well be an
unprecedented discretion in dealing with the problems involved. The

Court's position recognizes that Congress has ordered in general
terms that the Commission should regulate rates. Within that man-

date, the Court reasoned, the Commission can do whatever is
necessary so long as the approach adopted bears some semblance of
rationality and does not contravene any explicit prohibition in the Act

or the Constitution. Professor Fuchs has referred to this position as
the charter for a new administrative state. He notes that:
Two decisions'"6 of the . . . Court in the 1967-68 Term, enlarging a trend
which has been developing for some time, create a new basis for expanding the
methods by which federal regulatory agencies may meet new problems. This
foundation for extending authority and adapting administrative process to new
issues involves a major realignment of judicial, agency, and legislative
authority . . . . The agency operations which result, although they continue
to have a statutory basis, may range considerably beyond those which the
5
mandate of existing legislation can accommodate comfortably1 7

With this in mind, we turn to a consideration of "whether the
Commission may, consistently with the Constitution and the Natural
Gas Act, regulate producers' interstate sales by the prescription of
maximum area rates, rather than by proceedings conducted on an
individual producer basis."'5 8 In affirming the constitutionality of the

area, group-type regulation, Mr. Justice Harlan wrote for the
majority:
[T]he Constitution does not forbid the imposition, in appropriate
circumstances, of maximum prices upon commercial and other activities. A
legislative power to create price ceilings has, in "countries where the common
law prevails, been customary from time immemorial . . . ." Its exercise has
regularly been approved by this Court . . . No more does the Constitution
prohibit the determination "of rates through group or class proceedings. This
Court has repeatedly recognized that legislatures and administrative agencies
may calculate rates for a regulated class without first evaluating the separate
156. In addition to the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, Professor Fuchs'is referring to
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
157, Fuchs, The New A dministrativeState:JudicialSanctionforAgencySelf-Determination
in the Regulation of Industry, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 216 (1969).
158. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,768 (1968).
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financial position of each member of the class; it has been thought to be
sufficient if the agency has before it representative evidence, ample in quantity
to measure wlith appropriate precision the financial and other requirements of
the pertinent parties;.'1

The cases relied upon by the Court had upheld wartime price and
rent controls as well as the use of group rates in regulating the

transportation industries. 6 ' These cases clearly establish the general

constitutionality of such action assuming that the method adopted is a
rational method to regulate the particular industry. One difficulty

with the Court's opinion is its failure to deal explicitly with this
question of rationality except as the area approach was viewed as a

solution to the burden of individual firm ratemaking. The Court had
no legislative record upon which to premise its findings of rationality,

so one must assume that reliance was placed upon the Commission's
expertise and discretion. While a substantial argument can be made
that the regulation does not serve the overall public interest,' nothing
compels the conclusion that the regulation is irrational. Given the

Court's handling of such questions in the past thirty years, it is neither
surprising nor unfortunate that the Court refused to settle this issue.'
The more controversial section of the opinion is the Court's

agreement that the area rate regulation is within the authorization of
the Natural Gas Act. Although the Act probably did not originally

envisage the group approach to regulation, such an approach was not
precluded. Certain language in the Act describing those subject to its

requirements was drafted in the singular, suggesting a requirement of
individual regulation. 6 3 However, the broader reading permitting
159. Id. at 768-69 (citations omitted).

160. See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 326, 341 (1967) (railroad
rates); New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947) (same); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503 (1944) (wartime rent controls); Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936) (rate regulation
of stockyards and packers); United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435 (1936) (same); Tagg Bros. &
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930) (same); United States v. Abilene &S. Ry., 265
U.S. 274, 290-91 (1924) (railroad rates); New England Div. Case, 261 U.S. 184, 196-99 (1923)
(same).
161. Note the argument by Professor Kitch, text accompanying note 153 supra.
162. This opinion may be qualified upon recalling that it was the Court, in the Phillips case,
that initially required the Commission to regulate the independent producers. While perhaps the
Court should have reviewed that basic proposition, it correctly abstained from doing so on the
level of constitutional interpretation.
163. For example, section 5(a) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 provides that
[W]henever the Commission. . . shall find that any rate. . . collected by any naturalgas company in connection with transportation or sale of natural gas . . . is unjust
... . [the Commission] shall fix the same by order: Provided, however, That the

Vol. 1970:653]

AREA RATE REGULATION

group regulation may bejustified by interpreting the Act, as the Court
did,"4 to impose its obligation severally upon each producer. While

the legislative history is inconclusive on this point, 65 it seems
reasonably clear that Congress never considered the question. The
Court found support for area type regulation in the broad purpose of

the Natural Gas Act. Reasoning that the Commission's authority
must be broad enough to enable it to achieve those purposes, 66 the

Court stated that the Commission's broad ,and increasing
respons'ibilities demand a "generous construction of its statutory

authority."'67 Moreover, the Court noted, the Commission should not
be limited by its past regulatory practices if new methods better serve
the ultimate purposes of the Act.'68 Rejecting the producers'
contention that Hope had implicitly proscribed area rate regulation,
the Court contended that the Hope decision merely repudiated "the

suggestion that courts may properly require the Commission to
employ any particular regulatory formula or combination of

formulae."'6
As noted earlier, individual firm ratemaking was not
accomplishing the purposes of the Act.7 0 The administrative burden

had become so great that the cost in time and money defeated the very
purpose of regulation. The Commission's choice as a practical matter

was between some form of group regulation or no effective regulation
at all. Moreover, it is questionable whether individual firm cost-ofCommission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained in the
currently effective schedule of such natural-gas company. . . .15 U.S.C. § 717 (1964)
(emphasis added).
164. 390 U.S. at774.
165. See Hearingson the Public Utility Act of 1935 (H.R. 5423) Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-3 (1935); Hearingson H.R.
11662 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1936); Hearingson H.R. 4008 Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
74th Cong., IstSess. (1937); Hearingson Public Utility Act of 1935 (S. 1725) Before the Senate
Comm. on Interstate Commerce. 74th Cong., IstSess., pt. 1 (1935).
166. The Court cited the Commission's extensive authority under section 16 of the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1964), which provides that the Commission "shall have power to
perform any and all acts, and to prescribe. . . such order, rules, and regulations as it may find
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of the Act. 390 U.S. at 776 nA0.
167. 390 U.S. at776.
168. "It follows that rate-making agencies are not bound to the service of any single regulatory formula; they are permitted, unless their statutory authority otherwise plainly indicates, 'to
make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances'." id.
at 776-77, citing, FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942).
169. 390 U.S. at775.
170. See notes 102-04 supra and accompanying text.

690.
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service regulation arrives at a price that serves the public interest in an
industry with at least some competition. In similar situations, rates
are usually set on a group basis. 71 Thus, in terms of the economics of
producer regulation, some form of group ratemaking seems desirable
if one assumes, as the Court did, that the Act demands rate control.
The Commission's position that exploration and development would
be enhanced by calculating the needs of the industry as a whole rather
than that of each firm seems particularly persuasive. Finally, group
rates promote efficiency by providing an incentive to the efficient,
lower cost firm. The individual firm cost-of-service approach
generates considerably less incentive to economize since full
costs-even those of inefficient firms-can frequently be passed on to
the consumer.
The Commission's adoption of a dual rate approach is reasonably
adapted to balancing the relevant competing public interest
considerations- maintaining reasonable current prices to consumers
while assuring future supply by providing an incentive for exploration
and development of new reserves. Given the Court's generous reading
of the statutory grant of discretion, the adoption of this kind of
functional pricing structure is well within the Commission's power, at
least where it can be cost related as was feasible here. The extent to
which this cost relation is necessary is not clear from the Court's
opinion. The Court implicitly upholds functional pricing even without
the cost relationship so long as the Commission can justify it on some
public interest basis. 7 2 If this is true, the Commission might have
shown greater candor in its opinion if it had openly discussed the level
of income necessary to induce the needed supply irrespective of cost
and set prices accordingly. The Commission may be adopting this
approach; 173 however, one must remember that the Commission had
no indication that functional pricing would be permitted. Indeed, the
courts of appeals had previously indicated that the rates must be costrelated, at least to some extent 7
Dual pricing, or price discrimination, to serve competing goals of
regulation has long been permitted in regulated industries including
gas transmission and distribution. No apparent reason precludes its
use when gas production is the subject of regulation. One
171. The closest analogy is probably transportation rates. See GARFIELD

&

Loviov 79-80.

172. See 390 U.S. at 795-800.
173. This development is discussed more fully at notes 206-22 infra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
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commentator has suggested that the dual pricing structure adopted by
the Commission might violate the Robinson-Patman Act,'175 but this
questionable criticism was not mentioned in the Court's opinion.
A more important criticism is that the dual price system will not
provide the needed incentive for further exploration. For the
individual firm, of course, the prices received are lumped together to
arrive at the income available for new exploration. A higher price for
either old gas or new gas would generally provide more money for this
purpose. While supply is to some extent responsive to price, the exact
price and concomitant income required to elicit the needed supply is
uncertain. The Commission obviously thought that its cost-related
figures were sufficient, but this apparently has not proved true. 76 The
multiple rate does, however, provide an added incentive for firms to
find and market new gas since the price is higher. Although this may
enhance exploration, it probably also means a loss in the conservation
of already committed gas, depending upon the cost relationship for
each individual firm's new and old production. Therefore, prediction
or evaluation of the effect of the Commission's decision is extremely
difficult.
Accepting the validity of the Commission's general approach and
the Court's deference to Commission discretion in its adoption, the
next inquiry is whether the rates actually set return sufficient revenue
to satisfy the reasonableness standard of the Act and the due process
standard of the Constitution. On the basis of the evidence in the
record, the Court found that the rates met the Act's test of
reasonableness 17 7 and that the constitutional standard was identical to
the standard established by the Act. 7 " Mr. Justice Harlan did add a
cautionary note: "We do not suggest that maximum rates computed
for a group or geographical area can never be confiscatory; we hold
only that such rates . . . intended to balance . . . the investor and
consumer interests are constitutionally permissible.' '1 79 If the
producers could show that the rates returned less than full costs to a
large number of producers over a long period, a very serious
possibility of an unconstitutional "taking" would arise. The
producers, however, were unable to show that the rates would be
175. Kitch, The Pernian Basin Area Rate Cases and the Regulatory Determinationof Price,

116 U.
176.
177.
178.
179.

PA. L. REv. 191,215-20 (1967).
See notes 206-22 infra and accompanying text.
390 U.S. at 822.
Id. at 770, citing FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575,586 (1942).
Id. at 770, quoting, FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,603 (1944).
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confiscatory in this overall sense. Until such proof is available, the
cost data utilized by the Commission appear adequate to allow the
establishment of a rate meeting the "just and reasonable" standard of

the Act. As long as the Commission continues to perfect its
accumulation of cost data by requiring more complete and
comprehensive reporting accompanied by necessary price
adjustments, this regulation is unlikely, as a matter of general
application, to come within the proscription of an unconstitutional
taking.
The producers also raised the constitutional objection that a
particular firm's property may be subject to confiscation when the
firm operates at costs above the composite costs used in arriving at
the area rate. The Commission answered that:
The cases do not support the producers' contention that a just and reasonable
rate fixed on the basis of the overall costs and profits of the producers in the

area would be constitutionally confiscatory as to any respondent who could
support a higher price on an individual company cost-of-service basis.

The Court stated that a regulation is not necessarily a "taking" even
though one may operate at a loss as a result;' high cost operators
have no constitutional objection merely because they are more
seriously affected than others.' The Constitution requires only that
there be no "taking." Thus the firm cannot be required to operate
indefinitely at a loss. But short of this, it is permissible to require
firms to operate at lesser profits or-because of the interrelation of
value and return-even to suffer a dimunution in the value of the firm.
Thus, to provide an incentive to efficient operation, a price may be set
that will cause high cost firms either to economize or cease operations
Nevertheless, if an individual company was operating at a loss, a
serious constitutional question would be presented unless some means
were provided by which the producer could be relieved. In the usual
situations, such an entrepreneur may simply go out of business. The
Natural Gas Act, however, requires Commission approval for any
abandonment or transfer of interest.18 The Commission in Permian
declared that a producer should be permitted appropriate relief, either
in the form of a waiver 'of the maximum price or permission to
180. 34 F.P.C. 159, 179 (1965).
181. 390 U.S. at 769.
182. Id. at 769-70. See generally Note, Rate Regulation-Area Pricing- FPC Area Price
Regulation of Gas Producers Upheld, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 779 (1967) for a brief, but thorough,
discussion of this issue.
183. Natural Gas Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1964).
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abandon operations or sell the business, if its "out of pocket expenses
in connection with the operation of a particular well exceed its revenue
from the well under the applicable area price."' 4 With the exception

of this statement, the FPC opinion is vague and lacks any specific
enumeration of the particular circumstances in which relief might be

given, Concluding that the Commission's technique to enable the
producer to get out of the business had not been shown to be
inadequate, the Court left the question open for future consideration

in a case in which the Commission's provisions for special relief were
inadequate or unreasonably delayed.'t

5

No specific evidence was

presented to indicate that the price set would result in loss operations
for any particular producer. Thus any more precise treatment of this

matter was probably impossible and would have been premature.
This analysis, however, manifests two problems. First, efficient

operation is only partially responsible for variations in cost. These
variations result in substantial part from differing accounting
treatment of joint costs and, more important for present purposes,
from the operation of chance in exploration and development.
Therefore, to say that a producer operating at a loss is doing so as a

result of his inefficiency is not necessarily true. Rather, his loss is
perhaps attributable to the happenstance of exploration and

development. In addition, the firm may be producing from wells that
are nearing depletion and are consequently more costly. It would be

uneconomical, in the interest of long-run conservation, to force
abandonment of wells before complete depletion. In these ways, the
area approach may penalize some producers as well as consumers for

matters over which they have little control. This uncertainty in
exploration and development may differentiate the gas production

industry from other situations in which group ratemaking has been
184. 34 F.P.C. 159,226 (1965).
185. The court of appeals had reversed in part because the Commission had not articulated
sufficient standards concerning the grant of relief by waiving the maximum price or permitting
abandonment. Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6, 30 (10th Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court,
however, found sufficient the Commission's recognition of the problem and intention to deal
with it as such situations arose. 390 U.S. at 772. The Court specifically noted the experimental
nature of the proceeding and the absence-of any clear indication concerning the nature of
problems that might arise. Moreover, the Court felt that the general stay of the Commission's
order imposed by the appellate court was unnecessary to protect firms that might present such
problems. Rather, it assumed that stays would be granted in each instance by the Commission
as the necessity arose. Id. at 772-73. The Court stated: "We therefore decline to bind the
Commission to any inflexible obligation; we shall assume that it will, in situations in which stays
prove appropriate, properly exercise its statutory authority." Id. at 773-74.
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found desirable. In general, however, the countervailing argument of
administrative simplicity and feasibility overrides this infirmity so
long as the firms operating at an overall loss have a means for getting
relief. Moreover, the approach is still of an experimental nature and
will undergo significant modification in the future as specific
problems are brought to the Commission. Mr. Justice Harlan alluded
to this possibility: "Finally, we must emphasize that we understand
the present proceeding to be merely the first of many steps toward a
more expeditious and effective system of regulations. 186
Second, the Court's position assumes that the data upon which
the rates were based were fairly representative. The producers had
contended that the cost data used were not sufficiently representative
to ensure that the price set was reasonable. The cost data used by the
Commission in Permian and the subsequent area cases8 7 came
principally from the larger and presumably more efficient firms,
Distortion may result if these costs are used in arriving at the area
price. However, the firms supplying the information did represent a
large proportion of total sales volume;18 8 thus, even assuming
drastically different costs, the average or composite industry costs
would not have been affected greatly. Moreover, it is somewhat
disingenuous for the producers to blame the Commission for the
failure of many producers upon whose behalf the argument was being
made to supply the data.
The use of industry average costs raises a more fundamental
question. Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Permian
adamantly attacked the use of average costs in determining the rate
structure for all producers,'89 contending that such a method was
improper both in theory and as applied. Maintaining that "averages
are apt to take us with Alice into Wonderland," he cited examples of
the deception perpetrated by their use.' He objected most strongly
that industry-wide average cost figures fail to account for differences
186. 390 U.S. at 772 n.37.
187. See Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, No. AR61-2, Op. No. 546 (FPC, Sept.
25, 1968); Other Southwest Area Rate Proceeding, No.AR67-1, (Sept. 22, 1969) (Hearing
Examiner's initial decision); Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Proceeding, No. AR64.1 (Sept. 16,
1968) (Hearing Examiner's initial decision); Texas Gulf Coast Area Rate Proceeding, No.
AR64-2 (Hearing Examiner's initial decision, Sept. 16, 1968); cf. Pipeline Production Arc
Rate Proceeding, No. RP66-24, Op. No. 568 (FPC, Oct. 7, 1969).
188. See Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding, 34 F.P.C. 159,213-14 (1965).
189. 390 U.S. at 829, 833-37.

190. Id. at 835-36.
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in the performance of companies attributable to size differentials.
Advocating the use of typical, representative group costs,191 he
recommended narrowing the determination into subclasses in order to
obtain a more correct rate structure. His approach may ultimately be
considered by the Commission if practical results in the first years of
area regulation indicate that use of single average costs rewards larger
producers to the detriment of the small producers.
These problems facing the small producer who attempts to operate
within the confines of the area merit consideration. The large
producer has significant cost advantages due to the economies of scale
that exist in this aspect of the industry, particularly in exploration
and development where the large integrated oil producers maintain sizeable staffs to prepare detailed geological information. The
small producer, on the other hand, is forced to operate at a
much riskier level and expend capital on more speculative ventures.
To gear the cost evidence to the large producer may be inequitable
to the small producer. Since the industry may approach oligopoly,
at least as to its conduct,.' any regulation should clearly hav6 as
one of its ultimate purposes the maintenance of the competitive
aspects of the industry unless such regulation is shown to result in
significant subsidization of inefficient operations. The retention and
encouragement of small producers could assure some measure of
competition. However, the current. decision may favor the large producer, and the ultimate effect is to create a spiral toward increased
oligopoly. Small, independent producers will be forced to abandon
operations or sell to larger firms if they cannot meet their costs.
Even if the small producer can meet these costs the question remains
whether he can obtain enough capital to engage in further exploration
and development to secure needed reserves.
Nevertheless, area rates do not appear to leave the small producers
in a significantly worse position than if field price were used or if there
were no regulation at all. In these circumstances the small producer
would have to sell at a competitive price set primarily on the basis of
the costs of the larger producers. It would probably not be able to
secure a price that reflected its higher costs. Even though this
situation apparently existed prior to the area proceedings, 3 small
producers do not seem to have been abnormally deterred from
191. Id. at 834-35.
192. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
193. See the Hearing Examiner's opinion appearing in 34 F.P.C. at 360-63.
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entering the business. Moreover, the "disadvantage" is further
alleviated by the exploration assistance given small producers by the
large producers as a method of spreading risk.'9 There is no reason to
believe that the area rates will change this form of subsidy.
Finally, the overall affirmances by the Court included approval of
the rate of return adopted by the Commission." 5 The Court noted that
substantial evidence suggested that this rate would allow the
producers "to 'maintain financial integrity, to attract capital, and to
compensate investors for the risks assumed'""" without being
excessive.

197

The remainder of the Court's opinion dealt with the relatively
minor rulings that the Commission had found necessary to implement
its overall plan. Thus the Commission's discretionary inclusion of
quality variations as a risk of production was upheld since it was
accompanied by adequate findings concerning the revenue
consequences of the variations. 9 The Court held that the two and
one-half year moratorium imposed by the Commission upon the filing
of proposed rate changes was within the authority granted under
sections 5 and 16 of the Act, ieasoning that this "brief" period was
necessary to achieve the agency's purpose in implementing area rate
regulation. 99 In upholding the prohibition of price increases pursuant
to escalation clauses exceeding the area maximum,2 the Court stated
Although the Natural Gas Act is premised upon a continuing system of private
contracting. . . . the Commission has plenary authority to limit or to
proscribe contractual arrangements that contravene the relevant public
interests?"

Once again the Court deferred to the Commission's discretion and the
clear authority of the Commission to alter contract terms under
section 5(a). It pointed to evidence in the record that such price levels
were not cost-related and therefore were not consistent with the public
interest. Exemption of the small producer from the filing
194. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
195. 390 U.S. at 808.
196. Id.
197. Id. A reasonable argument can be made that the Commission was overly generous. See
Kitch, supra note 54, at 201-02. The FPC staff, as well as public intervenors, argued for a much
lower rate. See 34 F.P.C. at 200-04.
198. 390 U.S. at811.
199. Id. at 781.
200. Id. at 781-84.
201. Id. at 784.
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requirements was approved as a proper exercise of the Commission's
statutory responsibility, especially in light of the resulting decrease in
administrative burdens for both the Commission and the firms.F 2 The
cost saving to the firms, the Court reasoned, would partially
counterbalance their higher operating expenses.
PosT-PermianDEVELOPMENTS
The Commission's subsequent opinion in one other area case
and tentative decisions by Hearing Examiners in three more
independent producer cases °4 warrant brief consideration. First, in
response to widely divergent cost data among the fields in the area, the
Hearing Examiner in the Other Southwest Area case set different
price ceilings for each of three sub-areas. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the Commission in the Southern Louisiana Area case
adopted a three-tiered price ceiling: one price for gas discovered before
1960; another price for gas discovered between 1960"and 1968; and a
third price governing future discovery. This pricing scheme is
attributable to the fact that most discovery in this area is offshore and
entails greater expenditures for exploration and production. Finally,
in considering whether to apply the area rates to pipeline producers, the Commission divided the proceeding into two phases:
phase one to consider new gas-well gas prices and phase two to consider other gas. Although the Hearing Examiner generally concluded
in phase one that the area price system should not be applied,2 5
the Commission has now reversed his decision and, absent court
intervention, the area prices will apply to pipeline production of gaswell gas.
In the fall of 1969, a series of relatively minor FPC orders
indicated an extremely significant shift in policy. The orders reflected
the FPC's realization that exploration for and development of new
gas supplies had fallen significantly below the level necessary to serve
the gas needs of the very near future as was documented in an October
202. Id. at 787.
203. Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. AR61-2, Op. No. 546 (FPC, Sept.
25, 1968). A partial rehearing was held in September, 1969. The issues on rehearing were
recently expanded to include virtually the entire case. Offshore Southern Louisiana Area Rate
Proceeding AR69-1 (FPC Dec. 15, 1969).
204. Other Southwest Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. AR67-1 (Sept. 22, 1969); HugotonAnadarko Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. AR64-1 (Sept. 16, 1968); Texas Gulf Coast Area
Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. AR64-2 (Sept. 16, 1968).
205. Pipeline Production Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. RP66-24 (Mar. 3, 1969).
206. Pipeline Production Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. RP66-24, Op. No. 568 (FPC Oct.
7, 1969), rehearing denied, Op. No.568-A (FPC Dec. 5, 1969).
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1969 report by the Commission's staff32 7 Predicting that if present
trends continued the nation would face a significant gas shortage
problem by 1973, the report noted the decline in the reserve-toproduction ratio since 1946.
Despite this decline, the study reported, new additions to reserves
had always exceeded production until 1968. In 1967, for example,
discoveries totalled 21.1 billion Mcf in comparision to production of
18.4 billion Mcf. But in 1968, only 12.0 billion Mcf of new gas were
discovered, while production totalled 19.3 billion Mcf. The study also
reported that consumption had been increasing at a steady rate of six
percent per year with no indication of a future decline. At this rate, the
entire discovered supply would be exhausted in only a few years.
Indeed some pipelines have had to withdraw recent applications for
permits to expand because they were unable to secure a commitment
for an adequate supply of gasp1s Yet substantial evidence indicates
that the potential supply of natural gas is adequate.m It seems
obvious that the pricing mechanism established by the Commission in
the area cases is not inducing the needed level of exploration and
development.
Within a week after the staff report was released, the Commission
issued two opinions attempting to enhance the incentive for increased
exploration and development under the area rate concept. First, the
Commission decided that classification of gas-well gas as "old" or
"new" would be based on the date of discovery of the particular
reservoir, rather than the date upon which the production from the
relevant acreage had been contractually dedicated to interstate
commerce. 210 This decision potentially may encourage firms to
explore for new reservoirs within areas where gas is already being
produced through both increased exploration around a known
reservoir and through attempts to find gas at greater depths.
Although to some extent this extension of the higher rates for new gas
can be cost-justified, the Commission seemed primarily concerned
with providing a greater incentive for finding and providing such
207. FPC BUREAU OF NATURAL GAS, STAFF REPORT ON NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND

DEMAND (1969). See also O'Conner, GasSupply and the Role of the Independent Producer,84

PuB. UTIL. FORT. 26 (1969); FORTUNE, Nov. 1969, at 120; Address by Commissioner Baggc,
The Institute of GasTechnology, Oct. 30, 1969.
208. Address by Commissioner Bagge, supra note 207.
209. FORTUNE, Nov. 1969, at 121.
210. Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. AR64-1, Op. No. 567 (FPC Oct.
3, 1969).
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gas-a functional justification. Second, the Commission applied area
rates to new gas-well gas produced by pipelines!" This decision will
allow most pipeline producers to secure higher returns under the area
rates than they could justify under the individual firm, cost-of-service
approach. While the change to area rates could probably have been at
least partially justified on more traditional grounds, the
Commission's essential rationale apparently eschews such
justification and notes:
In light of an apparent gas shortage, we are concerned whether the pipelines
will make an increased effort to explore for and develop new gas reserves. We
are also concerned whether new gas supplies will be available to the consumers
of gas served by the long pipelines. To attain these ends, it may be incumbent
upon us to modify traditional approaches to regulation with respect to pipeline

production in order to provide a regulatory climate conducive to an aggressive
pipeline exploration program 312

In responding to the possible charge that such rates were not costpremised within the mandate of City of Detroit,21 1 the Commission
asserted that
clearly the "anchor" [the rate-base method] the court there felt should be the
"point of departure" in moving to a pricing system other than the conventional

rate-base method . . . lies in the approved just and reasonable area rates
approved for independent producers!"

On December 15, 1969, the Commission issued a very significant
order reopening the rate level question in virtually all areas 15 On a
petition for rehearing earlier that year, ,the Commission had decided
to reopen the question of the proper rate ceiling for new gas from the
offshore Louisiana area in the federal domain.2 16 In its December 15
order, however, the Commission extended this reappraisal to prices on
all gas in the Southern Louisiana Area, onshore and offshore,
irrespective of the contract date.
Equally important was the Commission's response to a request for
a nationwide proceeding to re-examine all the area rates. Although the
211. Pipeline Production Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. RP66-24, Op. No. 568 (FPC Oct.
7, 1969), rehearingdenied, Op. No. 568-A (FPC Dec. 5, 1969).
212. Id. at 4.
213. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
214. Pipeline Production Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. RP66-24, Op. No. 568, at 7 (FPC
Oct. 7, 1969).
215. Offshore Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. AR69-1 (FPC Dec. 15,
1969).
216. Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding, Dkt. No. AR61-2, Op. No. 546-A (FPC
Mar. 20, 1969).
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Commission refused immediate re-examination of the area rates,
reasoning that rates still pending in active cases should be determined
first; it expressed sympathy with the request for a review of the
Permian maximum and stated that the matter would be carefully
considered. These developments indicate that a major shift in the
Commission's approach to the area rates has been triggered by the
low level of exploration and development.
Finally, two related actions by the Commission indicate a change
in its treatment of research and development expenditures.
Traditionally requiring that such expenditures be capitalized as part
of the rate base, the Commission recently permitted two firms to write
off the cost of their participation in Project Wagon Wheel and Project
Rusilon as an expense! 1 7 Then on January 27, 1970, the Commission
announced a rule-making proceeding whose purpose was explained
by one Commissioner thus:
The incentive needed for greater R&D [research and development] activity
by jurisdictional companies lies in providing a greater degree of certainty
regarding the effect of R&D investment on the financial position of the
company and in enlarging the area of managerial discretion with regard to the
accounting treatment of such expenditures within the regulatory framework.
Consequently, just last month the Commission issued in Docket No. R-381
a proposed rulemaking delineating proposed amendments to the Uniform
System of Accounts intended to clarify Commission policy on accounting for
R&D expenditures. These amendments recognized the need to establish a
greater degree of certainty in the Commission's ratemaking and accounting
policies, the need to allow a return on significant expenditures for special
research and development projects amortized over a period of years and the
recognitition that so-called "unsuccessful" projects pave the way for
"successful" projects and as such should be regarded as part of the total
research and development effort. This policy should place jurisdictional
companies on a more equal footing with the non-regulated sector in
competition for capital investment in R&D particularly where projects
involving significant expenditures are concerned?"8

While it is difficult to appraise the developments at this point, one
can predict with fair certainty that the Supreme Court would affirm
these changes. The Permiancase seems to permit functional pricing if
it can be justified on a public interest basis,2 9 presumably including a
217. See Letters from FPC to El Paso Natural Gas Co. and Colorado Interstate Gas Co.,
Jan. 9, 1970 (reported in FPC NEws, Jan. 9, 1970, at 6). The projects involved application of
nuclear technology to release gas from deep strata.
218. Address by Commissioner Carl E. Bagge, Midwest Gas Assoc., Feb. 24, 1970.
219. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
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situation of declining supply. But whether the Commission should, as
a matter of policy, respond to this evidence by setting higher, noncost-related maximums is more questionable. Analysis of this issue
requires identification of the causes of the decline in new discovery.
The producers, as would be expected, contend that the rates set by the
Commission are so low as to provide little or no incentive for firms to
allocate funds to new exploration. However, this contention is selfserving; the firms could, as has been charged, drop their exploration
efforts temporarily or furnish misleading information hoping to
convince the Commission to raise the price. The substantial drop in
1968 coincided with the culmination of the Permianlitigation and the
potential opening of proceedings to examine the adequacy of the-rates
set on the basis of 1960 experience. In addition, the other rate cases
were all reaching the final decision stage in the Commission, and a
change of administration was imminent.
It is somewhat difficult to believe, however, that the entire decline
in discovery and exploration was intentionally created to force the
Commission to sanction higher rates, First, the cooperation and
coordination necessary to achieve such massive inaction throughout
the industry is unlikely to have gone unnoticed. Second, the amount of
exploration had been dropping steadily for several years previously,22
1968 only marking the most severe decline. However, some concerted
effort possibly occurred. The reserve figures furnished to the
Commission by the American Gas Association, an organization of
pipelines and distributors, are stated in general teris without
specification, breakdown, or explanation of methodology. Short of
requiring the firms to furnish specific information, the Commission
has no way of checking the accuracy of the Association's statistics.
Curiously, the FPC has refused to demand such information despite
its apparent importance.2 2 2 If a cooperative decision to delay
exploration or to furnish misleading data is at least a partial cause of
the decline in discovery, the Commission should move very slowly in
220. See FORTUNE, Nov. 1969, at 120, 189; Address by Commissioner Bagge, supra note 207.
221. Through 1967 the amount of new reserves added annually had remained constant.
However, as the decline in the production-reserves ratio illustrates, the addition of new reserves
had not kept pace relative to production. See FPC BUREAU OF NATURAL GAS, STAFF REPORT
ON NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND 11 (1969). Moreover, the number of completed wells

had been decreasing steadily, FORTUNE, Nov. 1969, at 120, 189, as had the number of wells
drilled. STAFF REPORT, supra, at 3"5. What is really needed, however, are statistics on total
expenditures relative to cost for exploration over recent years. No reliable data were available.
222. See Address by Commissioner Bagge, supra note 207.
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responding with higher incentive rates. Otherwise, regulation would
be meaningless. Functional pricing has no standard for evaluation
excelpt past performance. This standard is meaningless if the regulated
firms are not operating in good faith.
There are, however, other possible explanations for the decline in
discovery and exploration. The first is that the firms are not in fact
receiving an adequate return and the rates should be raised. Three
factors support this position: a sharp increase in exploratory drilling
costs; the increase in general interest rates and overall financing
expenses; and a shortage of current assets due to the refunds ordered
in conjunction with the area rate cases. The Commission's action in
permitting more flexible treatment of exploratory costs should help
alleviate the first of these problems. The third factor is a temporary phenomenon and should properly be relieved by some
form of Commission action. However, a general increase in rates does
not appear to be the correct solution. The second factor, related to the
general inflationary problem, is somewhat more difficult to counter.
A higher rate for gas would only add to that inflationary pressure.
The industry may be exhibiting the typical resonse to the antiinflationary pressure to cut back spending and expansion. If so, the
result is temporary, and one that should, in terms of the aggregate
economy, be desirable. However, as in the housing industry, a future
shortage is'a high cost to pay for this anti-inflationary adjustment.
Whether, under these circumstances, the Commission should resppnd
by raising rates presents a real dilemma calling for a careful weighing
of the ability of the firms to supplement depleted reserves in the future
against the overall inflationary effect of a rate increase.
Other factors may also be involved. The stagnant nature of the
current domestic oil market and the massive investment of firms in
exploratory efforts abroad and in Alaska probably affect gas
exploration. Gas normally obtained as a side product of domestic oil
exploration is lost, and money which could be spent on directional gas
exploration is channeled to non-domestic oil exploration. Absent
similar regulation of the oil industry, the Commission may have to set
rates providing a potential return for gas exploration equal to or
greater than the return anticipated from non-domestic oil exploration
Finally, it may be time for the Commission to consider the
possibility of altering rate structures at the wholesale market level to
discourage less desirable uses of gas. This position, advocated by Mr.
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Justice Jackson in Hope, will perhaps control the drain on existing
natural gas reserves.
One other recent development deserves mention. While all other
area cases have been handled on an adjudicatory basis, the
Commission has set the Appalachian-Illinois Basin Area rate case for
a rule-making proceeding. 2 3 The reason for this approach seems
twofold. First, the move suggests an attempt to expedite the process
by eliminating reargument of the basic questions settled in the other
rate cases. Second, and most important, the Commission is
considering a departure from the cost method and has asked for
comment upon the departure in the rule-making context. In an
apparent attempt to simplify administration, the Commission has
proposed that the rates in these two areas be based upon the cost of
purchasing southwestern-produced gas at delivery points in the
Appalachian-Illinois area. The Appalachian-Illinois Basin accounts
for a very small percentage of national gas pr6duction; yet the
industry in these areas is marked by a host of small producers. While
establishment of the price for area gas on the basis of gas prices
outside the area may result in excessive returns to some producers,
this disadvantage may be offset by the ease of administration,
especially since the volume of gas involved is small. The possibility of
excessive returns is further reduced by the comparatively expensive
gas production costs in the area. Although adoption of the basingpoint system in these and other minor production areas appears
reasonable, the system should not herald the abolition of all
regulation and reversion to market price in the major production
areas without extensive additional consideration.
Both Commissioner O'Connor and Commissioner Bagge have
recently suggested abandonment of the area cost-of-service approach.
Commissioner O'Connor has advocated a generally applicable basing
point pricing system similar to that proposed in the AppalachianIllinois Basin case.
It may be in the public interest to develop a pricing technique for future gas*
suppliers founded upon a careful evaluation of producer cost of new gas
supplies at a significant base point, such as the prolific offshore area, which
223. Appalachian and Illinois Basin Areas, Rulemaking Proceeding Dkt. No. R-371 (FPC
Oct. 16, 1969) (reported in FPC NEws, Oct. 17, 1969, at4). See generally Shapiro, The Choice
ofRulemaking orAdjudicationin the Development ofAdministrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv.
921 (1965).
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evaluates comparable new supplies in areas closer to interstate end markets in
light of transportation economicsP

Contending that present area rates have depleted gas resources
both by increasing consumer demand for the relatively inexpensive
fuel and failing to provide adequate incentives for exploration for
additional reserves, Commissioner Bagge cites the rise of intrastate
wholesale rates to-approach the level of interstate rates. Thus, he
argues, intrastate demand is eating into potential interstate supply.
Moreover, he contends, the importation of liquid natural gas at
significantly higher prices also indicates the inadequacy of domestic
supplies.
I
[G]as is not presently available in sufficient quantities.

. . to

moderate the

market price of new supply sources that are moving in to satisfy unmet
demand. In this situation . . . the role facing government policy in the

seventies is not so much to nurture the competitive vigor of base suppliers...
as it is to reinvigorate the base supply itself. Without a dynamic base supply of

natural gas, the interstate market will not be able to compete for supplies with
the unregulated intrastate market. Nor will there be any effective price

competition for the unconventional higher-priced supplies that are knocking at
the market door. But a base supply, reinvigorated, can be the key to the price
levels at which these new sources enter and can place the consumers less at the
mercy of the supplementary sources.1-

Commissioner Bagge's solution is, in essence, a return to free market
pricing "acknowledging the existence of the higher priced alternative
sources and basing the domestic producers' price upon those sources
with an appropriate discount for the cost of transportation."
Specifically he suggests the adoption of price indices based upon the
"market price of the highest or the average price of the alternate
increment of gas" available at the point of sale.
The significance of this approach lies in the complete
abandonment of cost and fair return on investment as the basic
ingredients in pricing; rather, he suggests the allowance of inflated
prices in the expectation that this will induce discovery of new supplies
of gas. Although nothing assures that the increased profits will in fact
bring forth the desired additional gas supply, on the basis of economic
theory one can reason that it should. The irony of the proposal rests in
its implicit statement that price control, assumed necessary in the past
when supply was adequate, is not desirable when supply diminishes
224. O'Conner, Gas Supply and the Role of the Independent Producer,PUB. UTIL.
Oct. 23, 1969, at 26, 33.
225. Address by Commissioner Bagge, supra note 218.

FORT.,
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vis-A-vis demand. If the market structure or conduct permits
monopolistic pricing, price control appears even more imperative
during a period of low supply. This seems particularly true when the
maximum control price reflects the higher cost of alternative sources
of gas, almost guaranteeing an unreasonable return on a cost basis for
the less expensive local supply.
Nevertheless, it might be desirable to pursue such a policy if this is
the only way to assure an adequate supply. This suggestion may be
premature since, arguably, the area rate approach has not yet had an
adequate chance to deal with the problem. In theory the area rate,
predicated upon a full recovery of costs and fair return on investment
considering the risks involved, should be sufficient to encourage the
necessary level of exploration and development. Several possibilities
for its apparent failure to provide the necessary incentive for
exploration and development have been suggested above: the
relationship to the oil market; the possibility of concerted action by
the producers to require an increase in or elimination of the area rates;
and the possibility that the rate of return reflected in the area price is
not sufficient to offset the risks involved relative to the potential
return on other investment opportunities. While the exact source or
nature of the problem is uncertain, the area approach needs flexibility
to reflect the greater expense and risk involved in the type of research
and exploration needed to bring forth future supplies. The
Commission has responded to this need in the manner indicated
above, suggesting that the area rate approach deserves a fair trial in
light of adjustments following Permian.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in the Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases is not the "final word" on the regulation of sales by natural gas
producers. Historical analysis of this regulation has shown that it is
not static but must adapt to new situations as they arise. In addition,
economic characterization of the natural gas industry does not fit
easily within the classic definitions of monopoly, monopsony,
oligopoly, or even workable competition. The industry encompasses,
at some point, characteristics of each of these, making "final"
regulatory decision impossible.
Although adoption of the area rate approach provides evidence of
the need for new regulatory methods, the precipitating factor for its
adoption was not the industry's new conditions but the need for an
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administratively feasible system. The Commission, attempting to
reduce its own workload, was forced to abandon outmoded
approaches to the regulation of natural gas producers' prices and to
adapt prior methods to existing circumstances.
Because the adoption of the area approach and its implementation
resulted from judgments based upon sketchy statistics, the approach
is still subject to reasonable doubt. Time is needed to test the
theoretical bases supporting the decisions of the Court and the
Commission. The decisions have, however, had one beneficial effect.
Nine years have elapsed since the Commission adopted this approach,
and over two years have passed since its "final" affirmation by the
Supreme Court. During this time the administrative workload of the
FPC has experienced a marked metamorphosis. While the area
proceedings still require considerable effort by the Commission, they
are clearly less burdensome than the former task of dealing with
producers' rates on an individual basis. Computerization of the cost
data should further lighten the administrative burden of rate
regulation. Nevertheless, the administration of rates is still a
burdensome and expensive task. One may question whether it is worth
all the time and expenses. In general, however, the area approach has
advantages beyond administrative feasibility once regulation of some
sort is assumed. The ultimate consumer is assured a fair price based at
least in part upon cost valuation rather than the field price technique
which is less certain to achieve competitive pricing. The transmission
firms have an incentive to bargain because reductions in contract
prices may inure to their benefit. The efficient producer is served by
higher profits, and the average producer should be able to recover an
adequate return.
The area rate approach will undoubtedly undergo more revisions
before a completely satisfactory method can be achieved. In a sense,
however, finality will never occur, since a periodic reappraisal of the
cost basis for the area rates will be required. Moreover, functional
adjustments may be necessary. In dealing with the gas industry's
complex economic structure and .unique regulatory history, the
Federal Power Commission must be aware of the constant need for
response to-changes within the industry, to exterior forces that alter its
traditional composition, and to the industry's relation to the
economic structure of the nation.

